Secure enforcement of isolation policy on multicore platforms with virtualization techniques by ZHAO, Siqi
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) Dissertations and Theses
8-2018
Secure enforcement of isolation policy on
multicore platforms with virtualization techniques
Siqi ZHAO
Singapore Management University, siqi.zhao.2013@phdis.smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons
This PhD Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
ZHAO, Siqi. Secure enforcement of isolation policy on multicore platforms with virtualization techniques. (2018). Dissertations and










Secure Enforcement of Isolation Policy on Multicore 















Secure Enforcement of Isolation Policy on Multicore
Platforms with Virtualization Techniques
by
Siqi Zhao
Submitted to School of Information Systems in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Information Systems
Dissertation Committee:
Xuhua DING (Supervisor / Chair)
Associate Professor of Information Systems
Singapore Management University
Debin GAO (Co-supervisor)
Associate Professor of Information Systems
Singapore Management University
Robert DENG Huijie
Professor of Information Systems
Singapore Management University
Jianying ZHOU
Professor of Cyber Security
Singapore University of Technology and Design
Singapore Management University
2018
Copyright (2018) Siqi Zhao
Secure Enforcement of Isolation Policy on Multicore
Platforms with Virtualization Techniques
Siqi Zhao
Abstract
A number of virtualization based systems have been proposed in the literature as
an effective measure against the adversaries with the kernel privilege. However,
under a systematic analysis, such systems exhibit vulnerabilities that can still be
exploited by such an attacker with the kernel privilege. The fundamental reason is
that there is an inherent incompatibility between the tamper-proof requirement and
the complete mediation requirement of the reference monitor model. The incom-
patibility manifests in the virtualization based systems in the form of a discrepancy
between the enforcement capability demanded by the high-level policy and the one
achievable through the system design approach mandated by the low-level hardware
enforcement mechanism.
The scenario is further complicated by an implicit assumption in existing works,
which is that the underlying platform is single-threaded. This assumption is becom-
ing increasingly distant from the real-world computing landscape where multi-core
machines have become ubiquitous. With the broken assumption, the adversarial
threads running on other cores gain capabilities that are not possible on uni-core
platforms and are possible to launch new attacks.
In this work, the existing systems are firstly examined in a systematic manner.
The consequences and implications of the aforementioned discrepancy are shown
by dissecting and examining existing systems’ high-level security goals and design
details of leveraging the hardware enforcement mechanism. Meanwhile, the issues
caused by concurrent execution on multicore platforms are presented. Two concrete
attacks are shown as the examples of the complications of the multicore scenario.
In light of the issues, Fully Isolated Micro-Computing Environment (FIMCE)
is proposed. FIMCE addresses the issues revealed in the analysis by managing in-
volvement of semantics from the kernel. It encloses a complete set of resources
needed by a program. FIMCE also features great flexibility and can be tailored to
various applications. Built on top of this environment, Immersive Execution Envi-
ronment (ImEE) is presented. ImEE is designed for efficient introspection through
consistent address space mappings. In the ImEE’s design, an isolated environment
is equipped with tweaked address mappings. It directly reuses the page tables of a
target VM and synchronizes the root of the page tables with the target VM. As a
result, the target VM cannot present fake address mappings to the introspection tool
to mislead the results.
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The Operating System typically acts as the reference monitor [15] that enforces the
system-wide security policy on a computer system. For such a purpose, it is granted
with the highest privilege. However, complexity in modern OS weakens its own
integrity guarantees and leads to frequent security breaches. Once breached, the
attackers obtain the same privilege as the kernel, therefore, it is possible for them to
launch arbitrary software attacks and compromise the entire system. Such attackers
pose serious threats.
The virtualization based approach was proposed to defend against this kind of at-
tackers because it leverages a higher level of privilege than the kernel. A number of
such systems have been proposed in the literature. However, these systems exhibit
certain issues, drawbacks and even vulnerabilities upon close inspection. In this
section, the severity of the adversaries with the kernel privilege is firstly described
as the motivation for the rest of the work. A brief summary of the virtualization sys-
tems is given next, so as to lay down the context for the research questions pursued
in this work.
1
1.1.1 Adversaries with Kernel Privilege
The Operating System is the entity that manages the resources in a traditional com-
puter system. Conveniently, it also serves as the reference monitor that monitors the
accesses to the resources by individual subjects, and enforces any security policies.
The reference monitor concept mandates three requirements to be satisfied, namely,
tamper-proof, complete mediation and verifiability. In the traditional computer sys-
tems, the OS had long been regarded as trusted in the sense that it maintains its own
integrity, i.e. it satisfies the requirement of tamper-proof.
However, just as any software, the OS also contains vulnerabilities that can be
exploited. Such exploitation is serious since it can lead to violation of any security
policies. Once inside the OS, the attackers gain the privilege of the kernel and can
manipulate the system-wide policy enforcement. Therefore, arbitrary attacks can
be launched. An example class of attack is the so-called rootkits. The rootkits are
malicious code produced by the attackers and injected into the kernel space, such as
the adore-ng rootkit [1] which modifies the kernel function pointers. In this case,
because the system-wide policy enforcement has been manipulated by the attackers,
even detection of these attacks is challenging.
The problem of the adversaries with the kernel privilege is relevant because of
two factors. The first factor is that the interface to modern OSes is becoming in-
creasingly complex. Such a complex interface exposes an enormous attack surface.
The enormity is exhibited from two aspects. First, the system call interface is known
to be large and complex. For example, Linux contains over three hundred system
calls and there are more on Windows. Many system calls also contain complex se-
mantics such as ioctl whose behavior completely depends on the device that it is
interacting with. Second, besides the system calls, the applications can also inter-
act with the kernel via implicit interfaces such as the file systems, e.g. /proc and
/sys. These interfaces also do not have clearly defined semantics. Therefore, it
is hard to reason about the behaviors of the applications and enforce effective poli-
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cies. In existing works, the complex interface frequently introduces challenges to
security designs that interpose on the system call interface such as Janus [45].
The second factor is that a modern OS consists of an enormous amount of code.
For example, the Linux kernel reached one million lines of code at version 2.1.63
[5]. Since then, the size of the kernel has undergone a steady increase. Version
4.15.9 has accumulated 20 million lines of code. The large amount of code results
in complex semantics that is reachable from the large attack surface. Therefore,
the likelihood of vulnerability is high and the modern OSes are routinely broken by
attackers.
In practice, the threat from a kernel level adversary is present in many scenarios.
One such scenario is when the kernel is owned by a party not necessarily trusted, e.g.
the manufacturers. In this case, there is no guarantee that the kernel will enforce any
security policy, including the basic isolation policy. In other scenarios, the kernel
may be compromised in various ways besides code injection. For example, data-
only attacks can leave the kernel data in an invalid state, leading to security policy
violations. As shown by the attacks that modify the identity in the cred structures,
it is possible to obtain root privilege.
Without modifications on the system architecture, certain integrity measurement
schemes alleviate this problem by measuring integrity at certain points during the
execution. For example, TPM-based integrity measurement [90] can be leveraged
to construct a chain of authenticated component loaded. However, this approach has
a great limitation because it only guarantees integrity during the load time. The ma-
licious behavior could be injected to the kernel after the measurement had finished.
An example is the Trusted Boot [11] which is a boot loader that utilizes the TPM to
perform measurement of the loaded OS image. However, integrity of the kernel at
runtime is not protected. Furthermore, integrity measurement is usually made over
code and static data, however, attacks can also be launched via modification on the
dynamic data. An example is the aforementioned adore-ng rootkit which modi-
fies dynamic function pointers in the file system layer. Integrity measurement does
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not cover the dynamic data, therefore, it cannot prevent this kind of attacks. Other
integrity measurement schemes, such as PRIMA [54] and Linux Integrity Measure-
ment Architecture [79], measure applications. Since they assume a trusted kernel,
they cannot be applied, neither.
1.1.2 Virtualization-based Systems
The virtualization based approach is an effective means to defend against the adver-
saries with kernel privilege. This approach is architectural in that it de-privileges
the kernel so that it is no longer the entity with the highest privilege. In such sys-
tems, the OS is de-privileged to run in a domain or virtual machine (VM), which is
managed and regulated by a higher-level entity usually called the virtual machine
monitor (VMM) or the hypervisor. By the nature of the attacker with the kernel priv-
ilege, only the OS is vulnerable; the hypervisor is not affected. Therefore, policy
enforcement by the hypervisor is not affected by such powerful attackers.
From a system perspective, the virtualization based systems are reference mon-
itors implemented by hardware virtualization mechanism. Hardware virtualization
mechanism allows the reference monitor to interpose on the hardware-software in-
terface through which traditionally the kernel directly interacts with the hardware.
The interposition allows the hypervisor to distinguish individual accesses to hard-
ware resources, thereby provides an opportunity to enforce security policies.
In its basic form, such systems enforce a type of policy called domain isolation.
In domain isolation, the hypervisor distinguishes accesses to hardware resources by
domains. The untrusted OS runs in one of the domains while the trusted OS and
applications run in others. Domain isolation guarantees integrity and confidentiality
of the trusted domain, which enables the establishment of further security properties
of the system. Examples include Terra [46], Lares [73] and HookSafe [96]. The
main drawback of this design, however, is that the TCB includes the trusted OS,
which is still large.
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Further systems push the enforcement granularity level towards the fine-grained
direction. They distinguish the accesses by more fine-grained entities such as pro-
cesses or even code segments. This approach eliminates the guest OS from the
TCB, because the logic in the kernel that manages the entities other than the ones
concerned is not needed. However, since hardware virtualization mechanism is not
aware of the concerned entities which are usually defined by the kernel, policy en-
forcement by the virtualization based systems needs to rely on the facilities of the
untrusted OS that define such concerned entities, such as dynamic memory alloca-
tion, file systems and the kernel’s page table. The consequence of the reliance is
that certain semantics from the untrusted kernel is involved in the policy enforce-
ment process, which creates issues. The issues of the involvement are elaborated in
Section 1.3. In the rest of the work, this approach is called the memory isolation
because the fine-grained entities are usually memory segments.
A number of existing works have utilized the hardware virtualization mecha-
nism for various security purposes. For the rootkit problem, for example, SecVisor
[80] ensures that only whitelisted code can execute with kernel privilege. Lares
[73] protects the integrity of hooks placed in the kernel. HookSafe [96] proposes a
lightweight approach to protect kernel function pointers by aggregating them.
The virtualization mechanism is also versatile so that it can be used for many
other security objectives when facing a malicious kernel, such as isolated execution
[46, 68, 51, 26, 29, 93, 86], memory compartmentalization [67], integrity measure-
ment [17], stealthy debugging [41, 37], enforcing execute-only permission [32, 97]
and virtual machine introspection [49, 24, 39, 42, 56]. Chapter 2 provides a list of
description of these systems.
1.1.3 Issues and Research Objectives
Effectiveness of Policy Enforcement The virtualization based systems are refer-
ence monitors implemented by hardware virtualization mechanism. Since hardware
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virtualization mechanism mandates a special form of policy, the systems all need to
translate the elements of the high-level security policy into the special form, which
is expressed with the abstractions both within the virtualization context and ob-
servable at the hardware-software interface, e.g. memory pages and domains. For
example, TrustVisor enforces that only a sensitive module can access its own code
and data. It needs to translate “the sensitive module” into “a registered set of pages”.
The main issue is that the translation process involves semantics from the un-
trusted kernel, because the high-level entities are defined and managed by the un-
trusted kernel. However, most systems do not explicitly describe this translation
process. The extend to which such semantics is involved is not clear, neither the
consequences.
Because of involvement of the semantics from the kernel, effectiveness of pol-
icy enforcement can be affected by the subtlety in the translation process. The
subject and object identity are vulnerable to manipulation and can be inconsistent.
For example, when processes are identified by CR3 values, the processes can be
impersonated since the values are managed by the untrusted kernel. Also, the medi-
ation of the operations by the hypervisor can be incomplete. Therefore, it remains
an important research question: how effective can a system based on virtualization
techniques enforce the high-level policies?
Enforcing Isolation In order to enforce the high-level policies, the fundamental
guarantee the hypervisor needs to provide is isolation. Isolation concerns about the
identity of the entities in the high-level policies. It refers to the requirement that
there is no overlap between the low-level representations for any two high-level
policy entities. For example, no “sensitive modules” share a memory page. Here,
the issues of existing systems are two fold. First, as mentioned above, isolation is
enforced with semantics from the untrusted kernel. Second, when the first issue is
compounded with concurrent execution, the enforcement become ineffective.
In virtualization based systems, the specific translation that the hypervisor needs
to perform is from the high-level entities to the low-level domains defined by the
6
extra paging structures. Since the kernel firstly defines the high-level entities, the
kernel semantics which is the identities information recorded in the kernel page ta-
bles is needed to craft the low-level domains. During policy enforcement, because
the observed accesses through the hardware-software interface are influenced by the
address translation configurations, the kernel can still influence the policy enforce-
ment by manipulating the kernel semantics. Many systems noticed this issue and
performed checks on the kernel’s page table on various occasions. However, such
checks are ad-hoc and not systematic.
Furthermore, the fact that modern hardware platforms are multi-core compli-
cates the situation. Parallel execution on multi-core platforms allows the untrusted
domain and the trusted domain to run at the same time, which cannot occur on
single-threaded platforms assumed by previous works. The untrusted domain thus
can take advantage of any resources available to attack the trusted domain.
Therefore, whether existing approaches still guarantee isolation on a multi-core
platform requires a closer investigation. Due to the importance of isolation, we
pose the second research question. How to ensure secure isolation by virtualization
techniques on modern multi-core hardware systems?
Consistent Introspection An isolated trusted domain can serve as a suitable
standpoint for extending the trust beyond. One possibility is that it can be used to
scan the memory content inside other domains; a technique called Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI). VMI is a prerequisite of many analyses that aim to detect ma-
licious activities, because it provides the raw data for the detection tools to analyze.
The VMI systems face a special form of the policy translation issue mentioned
above. Although they do not necessarily enforce any policy over the other domains,
they do need to translate the high-level objects typically in memory to raw bytes
observed by the hypervisor. More precisely, the VMI systems need to translate
the virtual addresses of the objects into the physical addresses so that it can read
the content out. Inevitably, the kernel’s page tables in the untrusted domain are
involved.
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The previous VMI tools rely on software logic to walk the kernel’s page tables
during the translation process. However, the kernel can modify its own page tables
in arbitrary ways, which affects the memory layout of the untrusted domain. As
a consequence, the VMI tools do not have a consistent view of the virtual address
space. Any further analysis, therefore, leads to invalid results. This method is
also slow because the page table walks require a series of loads from the memory.
Therefore, the agility of introspection cannot match with the untrusted domain’s
operations on the address mappings. In the face of these issues, the last question is
thus: how to ensure consistency in memory introspection?
1.2 Threat Model
The adversary in consideration is one with the kernel privilege. For example, the ad-
versary may be the kernel infected by the rootkits. However, the means by which the
adversary obtains this privilege is irrelevant. With the kernel privilege, the adversary
can launch arbitrary software-based attacks, such as arbitrary memory accesses and
execution context manipulations. He is also capable of manipulating external de-
vices that he can access for his purposes. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the BIOS,
the firmware and the hardware components in the platform are not compromised
by the adversary and behave in compliance with the respective specifications. The
hypervisor’s code, data and control flow are trusted throughout the lifetime of the
platform. Side channel attacks are not considered, nor are denial-of-service attacks.
1.3 Security Policy Enforcement
As stated in Section 1.1.2, the virtualization based systems interpose on the
hardware-software interface in order to enforce a set of high-level security poli-
cies. Following the reference monitor concept [15], they need to satisfy three basic
requirements, namely, tamper-proof, complete mediation and verifiability. Among
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these, the tamper-proof requirement is satisfied due to the higher privilege. Mean-
while, the requirement of verifiability typically requires formal verification of the
logic which is a separate field of study, therefore, it is out of the scope of this work.
The focus here is the interaction between the tamper-proof requirement and the
complete mediation requirement. Ideally, both requirements should be met to guar-
antee effectiveness of policy enforcement. The tamper-proof requirement is met by
adopting the virtualization mechanism; the higher privilege ensures integrity of the
hypervisor. However, this design approach introduces inevitable involvement of se-
mantics from the untrusted kernel. The involvement, if not treated with care, can
cause failure in meeting the complete mediation requirement.
Involvement of semantics from the untrusted kernel is inevitable due to the point
of interposition in the virtualization based systems. At the hardware-software inter-
face, only hardware related states are available, such as the physical addresses of the
memory accesses, the current value of the program counter or the root of the current
page tables. As a result, there exists a wide gap between this information and the
one needed to make useful inference at the level of the high-level policy, leading
to a discrepancy between the capability needed to enforce the high-level policy and
the one achievable by the naive use of virtualization mechanism. The gap is there-
after referred to as the inference gap. Bridging the inference gap requires semantics
from the untrusted kernel because the high-level entities are defined by the untrusted
kernel. Therefore, the specific strategy adopted by individual systems to leverage
such semantics to close the inference gap provides key insights into effectiveness
of policy enforcement. Chapter 3 examines involvement of such semantics in the
gap-bridging attempts.
Also addressed in Chapter 3 are the issues with respect to concurrency. Possi-
ble issues of existing schemes are discussed. In addition, two concrete attacks are
presented. The stifling attack allows the guest kernel to preserve stale access per-
missions for certain memory pages and prevent the hypervisor from revoking the
permissions. The VPID attack exploits a performance optimization feature also to
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keep stale permissions. Chapter 3 provides detailed descriptions of these attacks.
1.4 Enforcing Isolation Policy on Multicore Plat-
forms
The aforementioned inference gap results in an incomplete isolation boundary when
enforcing the isolation policies on multi-core platforms. The reason is that kernel
semantics in the guest page tables is involved to translate the subjects and objects,
while the guest page tables are subject to manipulation by the guest kernel on a
multi-core platform. Therefore, an approach called full isolation which specifically
takes multi-core platforms into consideration is proposed.
The full isolation approach controls involvement of kernel semantics in the en-
forcement process of the isolation policy. It applies this principle in its isolation
of the memory of the sensitive program, of a physical processor core and of any
needed I/O devices. The isolated core, memory and devices form an isolated exe-
cution environment which is termed Fully Isolated Micro-Computing Environment
(FIMCE). Similar to existing works, the FIMCE leverages on the hardware virtu-
alization extension and uses the hypervisor’s control on the system resources to
achieve isolation.
Due to the full isolation approach, the isolation boundary is clearly defined. The
hardware resources are cleanly divided between the trusted and the untrusted, in-
cluding the core, the memory and any external devices. Because of the complete
control over involvement of semantics from the kernel, the inference gap is elimi-
nated. Plus, the concurrency issues are also eliminated by full isolation. The overall
benefit is that the malicious guest kernel cannot interfere with management of the
identities, neither can it disrupt the execution of the isolated environment.
Another advantage of FIMCE is that the configuration is rather nimble. The
hypervisor is free to tweak the hardware configuration of the FIMCE for innovative
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use cases. Meanwhile, FIMCE provides a suite of useful libraries for the isolated
application, so that the application does not need to be self-contained. The libraries
are loaded on demand to minimize the amount of code inside the environment,
reducing the risk. To relieve the hypervisor from managing any file system, the
library loading process is delegated to the kernel. Thus, the hypervisor’s logic is
simplified, minimizing its code size. Although the kernel handles library loading,
the integrity of the libraries is verified after they are loaded. The linking between
the libraries and the application is also verified.
The recently emerged Software Guard Extension (SGX) to the x86 architecture
provides hardware based isolation to the applications. Although SGX offers strong
memory isolation guarantees, compared to the FIMCE it lacks full isolation and I/O
capabilities. A comparison between SGX and the FIMCE and a discussion about
possible ways to integrate both for stronger security guarantees are presented.
1.5 Consistent Virtual Machine Introspection
The fully isolated environment can be applied for consistent and efficient Virtual
Machine Introspection (VMI). As introduced in Section 1.1.3, in a traditional out-
of-VM VMI system, the introspection program faces a special form of the inference
gap. The gap is between the memory view at the level of the concerned data ob-
jects in the target VM and the low-level memory view provided by virtualization
primitives. In a traditional VMI system, the gap is bridged by the replication of the
MMU logic of the target VM and the guest page tables. The replication is neces-
sary because the VMI tools need to translate the virtual addresses used in the target
VM to the physical addresses. However, the replication causes issues. It is not only
slow due to emulation of the hardware logic, but also not consistent due to repli-
cated page table data. It is thus possible for a malicious target VM to present a fake
memory view to the introspection tool, while use another for its own execution.
The Immersive Execution Environment (ImEE) addresses these issues. The
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ImEE is a special execution environment based on the FIMCE with tweaked ad-
dress space mappings. The ImEE directly reuses the address space mappings of the
target VM by setting the CR3 register to be the same value as the one in the target
VM. During execution of the ImEE, the hypervisor also ensures that the CR3 value
is always synchronized with the value in the target VM. Therefore, this design en-
sures that the target VM cannot manipulate any address translations to hide memory
content, neither can it stealthily switch to another set of mappings.
Besides a consistent memory view, utilization of hardware virtualization mecha-
nism provides the ImEE a performance advantage, too. In the evaluations, the ImEE
shows a remarkable speedup compared to existing software-based tools. Serving as
a memory access engine, the ImEE can be integrated with existing VMI tools, pro-
viding immediate benefits.
1.6 Background
The following two pieces of background knowledge are necessary for the under-
standing of the rest of the content. First, the address translation process in a vir-
tualized platform is necessary, which is self-evident. The first subsection provides
a brief description of the process. For the full details, the readers are referred to
the Intel’s Software Developer Manual. The second subsection describes memory
access in a symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) system. This is necessary for the
understanding of the multi-core complications.
1.6.1 Address Translation in Virtualization
With hardware-assisted memory virtualization, address translation is divided into
two stages for any memory access inside the guest. In the first stage, the MMU
translates a virtual address (VA) into a Guest Physical Address (GPA) by walking
the guest page tables managed by the kernel. In the second stage, the MMU trans-
lates a GPA to a Host Physical Address (HPA) by traversing the EPTs managed by
12
the hypervisor. The roots of the guest page tables and the EPTs are stored in the
CR3 register and a control structure field called EPT Pointer, respectively. Dur-
ing address translation, the MMU raises an exception if the type of a memory access
conflicts with the permitted types specified in these page tables. There are multiple
sets of the page tables in either stages at runtime. Only one set in each stage is active
at any time. However, the MMU does not switch the sets automatically, instead, the
system software is designated with such a responsibility. The kernel is responsible
for switching the CR3 for any reason that it deems appropriate, and the hypervisor
is responsible for the EPT Pointer switching.
To reduce latency of address translation, Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs)
in each CPU core cache recently used translations and access permissions. The
MMU traverses the page tables only when the TLBs do not store a matching en-
try. However, unlike data and instruction caches, it is the software, instead of the
hardware, that maintains consistency between the TLBs and the page tables. The
operating system and the hypervisor are expected to invalidate the relevant TLB en-
tries after updating the page tables except a few special occasions such as reloading
the CR3 register.
The TLB entries can be tagged to improve efficiency. In case of a context switch,
all TLB entries need to be flushed because the cached entries may not match the ad-
dress mapping in the new address space. When context switch happens frequently,
such as when there are frequent hypercalls, the MMU needs to walk all the page
tables again after each switch, which can incur performance penalties. With hard-
ware virtualization, the number of the page tables to walk can be sixteen1, which
means sixteen consecutive loads from memory. To avoid such performance penal-
ties, the TLB entries are tagged with certain address space identifiers such as the
Virtual Processor ID on later x86 architecture. With a tagged TLB, a TLB entry is
considered a hit during translation only if its tag matches with the current address
1This assumes a 64-bit guest with 4KB pages, therefore, there are four levels of page table. To
reach the guest page table in every next level, EPT needs to be walked because guest page tables
store GPAs. Each EPT walk also traverses four levels of page tables, assuming 4KB pages.
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space identifier.
1.6.2 Memory Access in SMP Systems
In an SMP setting, multiple cores access the shared physical memory independently
as shown in Figure 1.1. They may use different address mappings since address
translation is performed independently by each core’s MMU. The VA-to-GPA map-
pings on all cores are controlled by the guest kernel. Depending on the running
threads, the cores may or may not use the same set of page tables. The GPA-to-
HPA mappings are controlled by the hypervisor. In the most common design, all
cores of the same VM use the same set of EPTs since the GPA-to-HPA mappings
are for the entire virtual machine. In other words, the guest kernel’s scheduling, i.e.























Figure 1.1: The paradigm of memory access in an SMP setting. The first core has
TLB misses and accesses the memory via the guest page tables and the EPTs, while
the last core has TLB hits and accesses the memory without consulting any page
table.
In the SMP setting, it is more complicated to maintain TLB consistency since
the threads on any core may modify the shared page tables while the TLBs are local
to each core. Typically, the thread that modifies the paging structures initiates a
sequence of operation called TLB shootdown whereby the thread on the initiating
core fires an Interprocessor Interrupt (IPI) to other cores. Upon the arrival of an IPI,
a handler is invoked to invalidate those stale TLB entries on the receiving core. On
x86 platforms, the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC) is respon-
sible for receiving and sending IPIs. Its proper behavior affects the success of TLB
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shootdown, consequently TLB consistency.
1.7 Organization
The rest of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews closely re-
lated literature. Chapter 3 investigates the issues encountered by existing virtual-
ization based systems, including two attacks on the multi-core platforms. Chapter 4
presents the design of FIMCE. Chapter 5 shows an application in the context of





Virtualization techniques were shown to have application in security systems by
early works such as Terra [46] and Proxos [88]. These works utilize the virtualiza-
tion architecture in its crude form that one VM is assumed to be trusted while the
others are not. The security-critical software is subsequently run in the trusted VM.
Due to the isolation between VMs, the other untrusted part cannot tamper with the
code inside the trusted VM. Further works all are based on the isolation between
domains defined by the hypervisor, while they are geared towards different security
purposes.
2.1 Trusted Execution Environment
The goal of establishing a TEE is to protect confidentiality and integrity of a sen-
sitive task’s data and execution against attacks from the untrusted kernel. With the
blessing of the EPT, the hypervisor isolates a sensitive task’s code and data regions
so that the external software (including the kernel) does not have any access to
them. The rest of the section groups the literature of isolation-based TEE based on
the protected task’s scope.
Code Segment Isolation TrustVisor [68] proposes to protect a few memory
pages called a piece of application logic (PAL) and allows attestation. TrustPath
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[104] and MiniBox [62] both build on top of TrustVisor. TrustPath builds a trusted
I/O path between a device and an application end point. MiniBox realizes a two-way
sandbox by running a Native Client [102] instance as a PAL. XMHF [93] aims for
providing a framework for building hypervisor based solutions and is formally veri-
fied. Later version of TrustVisor is re-implemented on top of XMHF. XMHF serves
as the foundation for two systems that performs I/O isolation [103, 105]. Driver-
guard [28] is another work on I/O isolation. CAFE [57] also built on XMHF to
provide runtime isolation of secret binaries. As a separate line of research, SeCage
[67] combines software analysis and hypervisor protection to automatically extract
compartments that are protected by the hypervisor at runtime. Fides [86] also pro-
tects modules that consist of a few pages. However, the modules are not completely
isolated, the code portion is readable while the secret portion is inaccessible. On
ARM platform, OSP [30] combines the virtualization extension and TrustZone to
offer flexible on-demand protection of a piece of code.
Isolation of a code segment using a separate address space has been demon-
strated in previous works such as Gateway [85]. Although the secure driver code is
isolated from the guest kernel using shadow page table, it can also be achieved by
using EPT.
Application Isolation InkTag [51] isolates the pages of an application and only
allows the guest OS to access the ciphertext. A feature of InkTag is that it allows
application to express intention to modify the address space so that the hypervisor
later can verify the changes performed by the guest OS, a mechanism called par-
averification. Based on InkTag, Sego [59] improves on verification of the system
services. On top of the isolated execution, AppSec [75] provides a trusted human
interface for the isolated application. AppShield [29] does not allow guest OS to ac-
cess the isolated pages, requiring extensive wrapping of system call interfaces. The
idea of isolating an entire application has been demonstrated earlier by Overshadow
[26] and SP3 [101], although they are not implemented using the EPT because it
was not available.
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The difference in the scale of the protected memory results in different design
approaches. The systems that protect the entire address space typically need to
consider dynamic behavior of the region, i.e. newly mapped or unmapped regions.
Therefore, they need to track the changes on the address space. Both Inktag [51] and
AppShield [29] lock the page tables of the guest in order to perform such tracking.
The systems that protect only a few pages usually do not consider page swapping
by guest kernel. The protected pages are typically allocated by the kernel and are
assumed to be always present in memory.
2.2 Kernel Integrity
SecVisor [80] and HUKO [99] remove certain access according to the current code
occupying the CPU, in order to protect kernel integrity. While they both try to
protect the entire kernel space memory, SecVisor focuses on protecting the kernel
space as a whole from user space applications and untrusted extensions. HUKO
enforces a fine-grained access control model among kernel space subjects such as
kernel module and kernel code.
SecVisor [80] protects the integrity of the kernel code and uses a whitelist to
allow any listed kernel extension to be also integrity-protected. On the other hand,
HUKO [99] does consider dynamic kernel modules. For this purpose, it needs ker-
nel level semantics so it inserts a module into the protected kernel space in order to
track newly added or removed kernel space memory.
As a prerequisite to kernel integrity, SecVisor identifies the kernel by intercept-
ing all traps to kernel. To further harden the kernel, it ensures that the kernel always
starts to execute at predefined entry points.
Previous systems that ensure part or the whole of the kernel’s integrity before
the EPT include HIMA [17], NICKLE [76], HookSafe [96] and Lares [73]. HIMA
marks only measured memroy pages to be executable during runtime. NICKLE
separates the execute and other types of access to different copies of the kernel code
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using page table mappings. HookSafe ensures that the gathered kernel hooks are
protected. Lares also protects the hooks placed inside the guest using page table
permission bits. All these goals can also be achieved using the EPT.
2.3 Mapping Redirection
Heisenbyte [89] separates read access and instruction fetch to a code page to sep-
arate copies prepared for each type of access. The separation is applied to any
code uniformly. The EPT is used to distinguish the memory accesses. This type of
systems does not consider the kernel as malicious. However, when these systems
are deployed to practical use, the consequences of a compromised kernel should be
considered. Other measure, such as kernel integrity should be coupled with these
systems to ensure the security of the system as a whole.
2.4 Event Trap
The EPT can be utilized as merely a means to intercept certain access to memory.
After interception, the access is allowed to continue as per normal. Graffiti [33]
tracks the rate of allocation in the address space of an application by tracking mod-
ifications on the page table. It uses the EPT to intercept writes to the page table.
SPIDER [37] and HyperDBG [41] use the EPT to detect execution of code and data
access to memory to implement stealth debugging facilities.
Before the EPT became available, trapping events in the guest had been achieve
via using shadow page tables. As demonstrated in Patagonix [65], the execution of
any binary code is detected by marking memory pages non-executable. The EPT
can also be used for this purpose.
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2.5 Auxiliary Uses
The EPT can also be used to enforce access permissions that are not supported by
guest page table. For example, execute-only permission is not possible with guest
page table. Because once the P-bit is set, both read and execute permission are
granted, however, there is only the NX-bit that removes the execute permission. No
such bit that removes the read permission exists. Readactor [32] and NEAR [97]
leverage the EPT to enforce execute-only memory on the code pages of a protected
application to mitigate memory disclosure.
2.6 Virtual Machine Introspection
The fundamental problem of VMI is to acquire the kernel’s semantic by recon-
structing the kernel objects. Significant efforts have been spent on directly re-
covering the kernel’s data structures from the raw bytes. It can be based on ex-
pert knowledge (e.g., Memparser [22], GREPEXEC [23], Draugr [38], and others
[4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 47, 74]) and automatic tools (e.g, SigGraph [63], KOP [25], and
MAS [35]). These studies usually involve a large amount of engineering work and
are useful for memory forensic analysis. Since they do not emphasize on live mem-
ory introspection, the security and effectiveness of accessing the guest’s live state
are not their main concerns. In general, they are orthogonal to our study.
A more sophisticated approach is to reuse the existing kernel to interpret and
construct the desired kernel objects from the memory of a live guest. Based on
whether the introspection uses the guest VM’s kernel or not, schemes using this




In general, in-VM introspection schemes aim to save the engineering efforts by
relying on the guest kernel’s capabilities. Process Implanting [49] loads a VMI
program such as strace and ltrace into the guest VM and executes it under the
camouflage of an existing process. SYRINGE [24] runs the VMI application in the
monitor VM and allows the introspection code to call the guest kernel functions
under a guest thread’s context. When the guest kernel is not trusted, the security
and effectiveness are totally broken, because it is straightforward for a rootkit to
evade or tamper with the introspection. Hence, these in-VM introspection schemes
are only useful to monitor the user space behavior in the guest VM. SIM [81] is an
in-VM monitoring scheme against rootkits. To run the monitoring code inside the
untrusted guest, it creates a SIM virtual address space isolated from the guest kernel.
Hooks are placed in the guest to intercept events. The address switches between the
kernel and the SIM code is guarded by dedicated gates.
2.6.2 Out-of-VM Introspection
The out-of-VM introspection code stays outside of the target guest. Therefore, it
is capable of introspecting the guest VM to detect kernel-level malicious activities
without directly facing the attack. Virtuoso [39] generates the introspection code by
training the monitor application in a trusted VM and reliably extracting the intro-
spection related instructions from the application. The execution trace is replayed in
a trusted VM when performing introspection, during which data accesses are redi-
rected to the guest VM’s memory. VMST [42] is another out-of-VM introspection
technique. It manages to reuse the kernel code by running the introspection applica-
tion in a monitor VM emulated by QEMU [21]. A taint analysis runs in the monitor
VM and relevant data accesses are redirected to the guest’s live memory. Hybrid-
bridge [78] is a hybrid approach which combines the strengths of both VMST and
Virtuoso. Similarly, the VMI application is running in the trusted monitor VM and
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the OS code is reused. The kernel data accesses which are related to the monitoring
functionality are identified and redirected to the guest kernel memory when needed.
EXTERIOR [44] is another space traveling approach inspired by VMST, which sup-
ports not only guest VM introspection but also reconfiguration and recovery of the
guest VM.
Process Out-Grafting [84] relocates the monitored process from the guest VM to
the monitor VM. The monitor VM always forwards system calls to the guest. The
guest kernel handles it and returns the results to the monitored process. This ap-
proach requires the implicit assumption that the guest kernel is trusted. VMwatcher
[56] is a system that performs rootkit detection from outside of a VM by manually
reconstructing the semantic view.
TxIntro [66] is an out-of-VM and non-blocking approach designed for timely
introspection. It mainly focuses on retrofitting the hardware transactional memory
to avoid reading inconsistent kernel states. In its design, the VMI code runs on an
implanted core and can also access the guest memory at a native speed. Neverthe-
less, it lacks sufficient security concerns and does not provide the introspection code
a consistent memory view to that of the guest’s.
2.7 Isolation With Other Techniques
Flicker [69] makes use of trusted computing techniques to set up a secure exe-
cution environment at runtime. It explores AMD’s late launch technology which
incorporates the TPM-based DRTM. The late launch technique sets up a secure and
measured environment to protect a piece of code and data. The drawback is its high
latency due to the slow speed of the TPM chip. Moreover, the protected code cannot
interact with the rest of the platform.
The recently announced Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [53] offers a
set of instructions for an application to set up an enclave to protect its sensitive
code and data. The hardware isolates the memory region and ensures that data in
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the region can only be accessed by the code within. All other accesses are rejected
by the hardware. Nonetheless, it is not able to support secure I/O operations, e.g.,
taking a password input from the keyboard.
As shown in TZ-RKP [18], a security monitor that resides in the secure world
established by ARM TrustZone can protect the OS kernel in the normal world at
runtime. Virtual Ghost [34] uses a language-level virtual machine to prevent an un-
trusted OS from accessing an application’s sensitive memory regions. It requires
compiler support and source code instrumentation on the kernel code in order to
ensure control-flow integrity at runtime. PixelVault [92] creates an isolated execu-
tion environment on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). Being an isolated device
from the CPU with its own memory, GPU provides a natural ground for building
an isolated execution environment. In the past, programming on GPU was difficult
because of its highly specialized hardware. However, modern GPUs are becom-
ing increasingly programmable so that executing code on GPU is easier. Nonethe-
less, this approach still requires significant development effort because there is little
support from current systems. SICE [19] isolates a program that ranges from an
instrumented application to a complete VM from the guest OS using System Man-
agement Mode (SMM). Compared to the micro-hypervisor approach, it features
a smaller TCB since the TCB only consists of the hardware, BIOS and the SMM
code. However, compared to virtualization, SMM is less standardized, which makes
it hard to apply SICE’s approach on certain platforms. For example, SICE’s multiple
processor support relies on hardware features only available on AMD processors.
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Chapter 3
An Analysis of Effectiveness of the
Existing Virtualization-based
Schemes
As introduced in Chapter 1, to meet the tamper-proof requirement and the com-
plete mediation requirement, virtualization based systems resort to the higher privi-
lege level given by the hardware virtualization mechanism. Although this approach
guarantees integrity thus satisfies tamper-proof, the systems are confronted with the
inference gap which is caused by the system design approach dictated by the hard-
ware virtualization mechanism. Interposing over the hardware-software interface,
such systems are limited by the semantics available inside its trust boundary, i.e.
the hypervisor space. The limitation makes involvement of semantics from the un-
trusted kernel inevitable. In order to enforce the high-level policy, these systems
need to construct the view at the level of the high-level policy, however, they typ-
ically include kernel-defined entities. The construction occurs in a process called
policy translation, during which the high-level policy is converted to a form under-
stood by the hardware virtualization mechanism.
In this chapter, the policy translation process in various previous systems is
reviewed. And the involvement of semantics from untrusted kernel in the gap-
24
bridging process is analyzed. The purpose is to show how the effectiveness of the
enforcement is influenced. In doing so, firstly, a conceptual model that serves as the
foundation of the rest of the discussion in this chapter is described. Next, the details
of the policy enforcement process are examined. The virtualization based systems
are referred to as enforcement systems hereafter, because their purpose is to enforce
a set of high-level policy.
3.1 A Model of the Enforcement Systems
In this section, a model of the enforcement systems is described. The model pro-
vides a conceptual foundation for subsequent discussion of this chapter. It shows
the policy formulation process in the enforcement system. It emphasizes the trust
boundary and the involvement of semantics outside of the boundary during the pol-
icy formulation process.
The enforcement systems under consideration are designed to fulfill certain
high-level security goal by exercising the reference monitor model. The high-level
security goal is expressed in the form of a set of security policy, of which the en-
forcement realizes the security goal. For the actual enforcement, the enforcement
systems rely on certain low-level mechanism, such as the MMU, assumed to be
trusted. An illustration is shown in Figure 3.1. An example is a virtualization based
system for the purpose of isolation, which enforces a set of isolation policies. The
enforcement is achieved by configuring the MMU which is the low-level mecha-
nism.
The enforcement system resides in an environment in which there are two priv-
ilege levels, low privilege level denoted PL, and high privilege level denoted PH .
It is assumed that all entities in PH are trusted, while all entities in PL are not. In
practice, there usually exists more than one privilege level in a contemporary com-
puter system. All the privilege levels from low to high constitute an ordered set
















Figure 3.1: The Enforcement System Model
positions. All the privilege levels in the left set is denoted PL and only the lowest
privilege levels in the right set is denoted PH . The boundary between PL and PH is
call the trust boundary.
The model also shows the policy formulation process commonly observed in the
enforcement systems. Note the fact that the high-level policy is usually described
in natural language and involves terms that describe the user-facing entities of a
computer system. For example, a policy may be concerned about files, programs
or network connections. Furthermore, the fact that the enforcement systems are
programs themselves implies that the system designer needs to carefully convert
the policy to a form that can be understood by the systems, since programs do
not understand the language in which the high-level policies are specified. This
form understandable to programs is called effective policy thereafter. Lastly, the
reliance on the lower-level mechanism usually dictates a second conversion from
the effective policy to a form required by the low-level mechanism. This form is
called binary policy. The two stages of conversion are also illustrated as step 1 and
step 2 in Figure 3.1.
The point of mediation by the low-level mechanism on the accesses to objects
depend on the nature of the mechanism itself. Typically, the mediation occurs on
certain execution path that each access must undergo, so as to satisfy the complete
mediation requirement for the low-level mechanism itself. From an architectural
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point of view, the mediation usually concentrates at the interfaces between layers,
because all accesses can be easily intercepted when they cross an interface. In the
case of virtualization, the hypervisor interposes over the hardware-software inter-
face which is traditionally used by the kernel to interact with the hardware. In past
systems, the mediation typically happens at the system call interface such as the
Janus [45] system. A common drawback of this type of mediation is that the in-
formation available at the interface is limited compared to that which is needed for
certain high-level policy. For example, the hypervisors are only able to obtain in-
formation about physical pages, domains and program counters etc., all of which
cannot be directly related to the high-level entities.
3.1.1 Conflict Between Tamper-Proof and Complete Mediation
There are two observations that can be made from the model. First, in order to
satisfy the tamper-proof requirement, the enforcement system is isolated from the
untrusted for its own integrity via the privilege separation mechanism. Second, the
isolated states do not provide necessary semantics for decision-making at the level
of the high-level policy.
Due to the limited scope, the enforcement system is obliged to associate the
isolated states to the high-level entities. Note that the association usually involves
semantic information, not necessarily data, beyond the trusted boundary. Such se-
mantic information is defined by the software outside of the trust boundary. How-
ever, the enforcement system cannot directly execute untrusted code. Rather, it
needs to replicate the semantics-defining logic inside its trust boundary and then
acquire the needed semantics using the replicated logic. The consequence of the
extra acquisition step is that, the semantics acquired by they enforcement systems
is not always accurate. Such inaccurate semantic information relied upon by the en-
forcement systems presents an approximated view of the rest of the system, which
affects the completeness of mediation.
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In essence, the enforcement systems face a dilemma. For its own tamper-proof,
only isolated states are used which provide limited semantics. However, for com-
plete mediation, all semantics that are relevant should be used. It is, therefore,
possible that the scope required by tamper-proof mismatch with the scope required
by complete mediation. This situation leads to compromises in design that result in
sacrifice in either requirement. For example, the Chrome browser adopts a process-
based isolation design, and each browser tab is isolated using one process. The
security monitor of Chrome checks the origins of the accesses made by the scripts
on a web page to enforce the Same Origin Policy. To perform the checks, rich se-
mantics of the web page and scripts is required. The security monitor resides in the
same process as the scripts so that acquisition of the semantics is straightforward.
However, this design gives up on the tamper-proof, leading to vulnerabilities that
bypasses the checks [55].
On the other hand, many systems choose to ensure tamper-proof first. Conse-
quently, they are limited in the scope of semantics and must approximate by acquir-
ing the semantics outside of the trust boundary. In other words, they need to cross
the inference gap. It is shown in the subsequent sections that when this approxima-
tion is inaccurate, the complete mediation requirement is compromised.
CAVEAT The discussion here is different from the semantic gap problem dis-
cussed in previous works such as VMST [42] and Virtuoso [39], although they
appear to both be related to semantics. The semantic gap refers to the challenges in
interpreting the meaning of a chunk of bytes. The problem here is about the con-
sequence of the involvement of the semantics outside of the trust boundary in the
policy enforcement process.
3.1.2 The Inference Gap
The inference gap refers to the gap between the semantics provided within the trust
boundary and necessary semantics needed to enforce the high-level policy. The
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gap exists when the trust boundary does not encompass all the semantics needed to
construct the semantic universe defined by the high-level policy. Because of the fact
that the enforcement systems all interpose on the hardware-software interface, the
semantics in the trust boundary is limited. Therefore, the gap exists and semantics
outside of the trust boundary is involved in policy enforcement. Consequently, the
enforcement is not accurate because of the untrusted party’s manipulation of the
semantics. This is a challenging problem and exposes unexpected attack vectors to
the untrusted party.
In the enforcement systems, both stages of the policy formulation process cross
the inference gap. First, in order to formulate the effective policy, the enforce-
ment systems choose a set of trusted states inside the trust boundary to represent
instances of the entities in the high-level policy. The inference gap is crossed in the
sense that the trusted states are associated with the high-level entities by using the
identity-defining semantics beyond the trust boundary. Secondly, to formulate the
binary policy, low-level states and events observable by the low-level enforcement
mechanism are associated with the entities and operations defined in the high-level
policy.
For example, a hypervisor can securely utilize the architectural states and the
physical states of the guest VMs, i.e. register states and physical memory. These
states are considered to be inside its trust boundary. Now consider a case where a
policy concerns about user input data is desired. To enforce this policy using a hy-
pervisor, the hypervisor needs to deduce the physical address of the input data from
the guest’s address mappings. However, the guest’s address mappings are the se-
mantics outside of the trust boundary of the hypervisor. The hypervisor crosses the
inference gap in the sense that it uses this mapping to associate physical addresses
to the high-level entity which is the input buffer.
29
3.1.3 The Approximation Function
Crossing the inference gap needs to define relations to bind the states inside the trust
boundary to the intended entity at the high-level. A set of such relation is called
an approximation function. The approximation function is where the fundamental
conflict between tamper-proof and complete mediation manifests. Therefore, it is
given an abstract treatment first and discuss the concrete conflicts afterwards.
Informally, an approximation function Fapprox : S ! E maps from the states in
the trust boundary S to the intended entitiesE. For example, an enforcement system
based on the kernel contains the states that correspond to the OS abstractions, such
as files and processes etc., inside the trust boundary.
The construction of the approximation function is crucial to ensure that the view
at the level of the high-level policy is accurate. The basic requirement is that the
relations need to be stable in the sense that they cannot be manipulated illegally.
However, when the semantics inside the trust boundary is limited due to ensuring
tamper-proof, the involvement of the semantics outside of the trust boundary is
unavoidable. Such semantics leads to instability in the relations, presenting the
enforcement system an inaccurate view. As a result, the policy enforcement may be
carried out against the incorrect subjects or objects, or is not invoked when intended.
In other words, the complete mediation requirement is undermined.
Involvement of Semantics Beyond the Trust Boundary
The approximation function needs to be defined during both the policy formulation
stages, because the inference gap is crossed in both stages. In the first stage, the
relations about subjects and objects are defined. For example, the virtual addresses
of the objects may be recorded. In the second stage, depending on the low-level
enforcement mechanism, more relations may be needed and existing relations may
be updated. For example, the virtual addresses are replaced by their physical ad-
dresses. More importantly, the point of mediation is also defined at this stage. In
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other words, the low-level events that correspond to the operations in the high-level
policy need to be identified and intercepted. Conceptually, the approximation func-
tion also includes relations that map low-level events to high-level operations.
In many cases, there may be no apparent relation between the low-level event
and high-level operations, because the events in the low-level mechanism are con-
cerned about operations that are more primitive than the ones in the high-level pol-
icy. In this case, the events that high-level operations occur need to be synthesized.
The synthesis may be extremely challenging due to the inherent ambiguity of the
high-level events. For example, ’reading a file’ is inherently ambiguous and ex-
tremely difficult to define accurately using low-level primitives. There are at least
three ways. It may be defined to be the execution of relevant code that handles files,
or accessing in-memory file content by the processor, or issuing I/O commands to
the external storage devices. Nevertheless, certain semantics outside of the trust
boundary is needed to synthesize these events.
Implications
The consequence of using semantics beyond the boundary in the approximation
function depends on the type of relation that uses the semantics. If the relations
are defined in the first conversion stage, such semantics results in invalid identity of
either the subject or object, leading to confusion of the identities. If the relations are
defined in the second stage, besides the identity issue, certain events may be missed.
Both consequences tamper the complete mediation requirement.
In the input buffer example in Section 3.1.2, the approximation function involves
the mappings inside the guest page table, which is controlled by the untrusted ker-
nel. Since the kernel still controls the guest page tables, the mediation by the en-
forcement systems may be incomplete. A more in-depth analysis of this scenario is
given in Section 3.2.2.
In many systems, attempts are made to either verify the semantics each time
it is used or to control the source of it. However, whether such hardening does
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Code 1 Data 1 Data 2
Process 1 X RW -
Process 2 - - R
0x1000 0x2000 0x3000
0xA000 X RW -
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Figure 3.2: An Example of the Enforcement System
provide the required stability guarantee has not been systematically discussed. The
effectiveness usually depending on specific implementation details.
3.1.4 Example Use of Semantics Beyond the Trust Boundary
Let us focus on the conversion stages and use a more comprehensive example to il-
lustrate the details. The place of involvement of semantics beyond the trust bound-
ary is highlighted while the specific issues caused is delayed to later part of the
chapter.
The example is shown in Figure 3.2. The high-level policy is concerned about
restricting the access by two processes to three objects. The policy is an isolation
policy and the access matrix shows the authorization of each process’s access to
each object. Suppose this policy is to be enforced by a hypervisor based enforce-
ment system. The policy needs to undergo two conversions. The first conversion
converts it to the effective policy and the second to the binary policy. In the effective
policy, the rows and columns in the original matrix are replaced by the states in the
trust boundary of the hypervisor. Specifically, the processes are replaced by their
respective CR3 values. The objects are replaced by their virtual addresses (VAs)
passed to the hypervisor in general purpose registers. The corresponding permis-
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sions are kept intact. The second conversion breaks each row of the effective policy
to a set of EPT as required by the MMU. The VAs are converted to the correspond-
ing physical addresses (PAs). The EPTs are the binary policy here.
The hypervisor’s trust boundary stops short at the boundary between kernel and
hypervisor, since the kernel is assumed to be untrusted. However, both conversion
stages require certain semantics from the kernel. In the first stage, the example
system chooses the CR3 register value to represent the process, since normally each
process is designated with its own address space. Therefore, the subjects in the
rows are replaced by their respective CR3 values. Note that the relation between a
particular CR3 value and a process is kernel semantics. Directly using the CR3 value
essentially involves semantics beyond the trust boundary and can be potentially
problematic. Similarly, the objects are replaced by the VAs. The relation between
the VAs and the objects is also semantics under the control of the kernel.
In the second stage, the VA of each object are converted to PA to fill the first
column in the EPTs. Because the memory allocation is done by the kernel, this
conversion requires kernel’s page table. Besides, because in this example, one set
of EPT is only applicable for one process, the hypervisor needs to switch the ac-
tive EPTs whenever the process on the CPU switches. In order to track the process
switch, the hypervisor needs to interpose on the context switch events in the kernel,
which is also kernel semantics. In this example, the permission in the EPT is suffi-
cient to support the operations in the high-level policy, therefore, no event synthesis
is needed.
3.2 Policy Formulation
In this section, the issues caused by the involvement of semantics beyond the trust
boundary in the first conversion stage are presented. As discussed in Section 3.1.1,
the enforcement systems ensure tamper-proof thus face limited scope of seman-
tics. This limitation manifests in this stage in the sense that the semantics about
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the identity of the subjects and objects is missing within the trust boundary, thus
must come from the outside of the trust boundary. Subsequently, the main issue
is the confusion of identity of either the subjects or the objects, which causes the
enforcement systems to not mediate when they should. Therefore, the complete
mediation requirement of the reference monitor is undermined. Three cases are
presented depending on the type of subjects and objects, namely, process subjects,
memory ranges and privilege levels.
3.2.1 Process Subjects
Some virtualization based systems proposed in the literature such as InkTag [51],
Fides [86] and AppShield [29] isolate an entire process from an untrusted guest
OS. The high-level policy in their concern is about individual processes. However,
the virtualization based systems do not manage processes themselves, in order to
keep the hypervisor logic simple and the TCB small. The typical approach is to
piggy-back on the process management done by the guest OS and to override the
guest OS’s access to the resources allocated for the processes. Unfortunately, the
hypervisor needs the identifying semantics during the piggy-backing. The identify-
ing semantics reused by most virtualization based systems is the one-to-one relation
between address space and process, which is defined by the guest OS. The address
spaces can be identified via values in the CR3 register which the hypervisor can
easily monitor, therefore, many schemes, e.g. [51, 29] use the CR3 register content
to identify the process subject. It follows that in the effective policy, typically the
value of the CR3 register is chosen as the approximation of the processes. Thus, the
approximation function contains mappings from the CR3 values to the processes.
This scenario is the example shown in Figure 3.2.
In the example in Figure 3.2, the CR3 used for process 1 stores 0xA000 when
there is no attack. It follows that the hypervisor replicates a copy of the value
0xA000 and defines a relation in the approximation function from this value to
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process 1.
Since the relation between address space and process is semantics defined by
the untrusted guest OS, binding CR3 content to process is not secure. In the above
example, because the kernel manages the processes, it can load 0xA000 to CR3 for
process 2. The page at 0xA000 can also be modified so that the imposter process
can run its own code. When process 2 runs, the hypervisor mistaken it to be process
1, therefore, access to Code 1 and Data 1 is granted whereas according to the policy,
it should not.
A variation is the case when the subjects are threads. Similarly, thread identifiers
cause the same issue. Since threads of the same process share the same CR3, thread
identification in the literature (e.g., AppShield [29]) relies on both CR3 content and
the kernel stack location as the identifier. Similar to the CR3 falsifying, the kernel
can also swap kernel stack locations and contents between the threads.
3.2.2 Memory Ranges
The second case concerns about memory ranges. The memory range is a form both
the subjects and objects can take. For example, the policy subject are modules in a
program such as TrustVisor [68] and SeCage [67]. Also, almost any objects in the
high-level policy are memory ranges. An effective policy after conversion is shown
in Figure 3.3
0x1000 – 0x2000 0x3000 0x4000
0xA000 – 0x1A000 X RW -
0xC0000 – 0xCE000 - - R
Figure 3.3: The Effective Policy of Memory Ranges
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that subject 1 is between 0xA000 and
0x1A000 in its address space. Subject 2 resides in 0xC0000 and 0xCE000. The
permission assignment is as shown in the figure. This arrangement is in accordance
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with existing systems (e.g., TrustVisor [68], SeCage [67] and Fides [86]) that use
the instruction pointer stored in EIP to identify a memory range subject X . CR3 is
also used jointly for identification when X is in userland. When a memory range is
an object, the virtual address that is used to access the object is used to identify the
object.
The issue is that the mappings in the guest page table are included in the approx-
imation function. Since the boundaries of the memory range subjects and objects
are delineated using virtual addresses, the approximation function now contains
relation that maps certain virtual addresses to the high-level subjects and objects.
However, the virtual addresses are designated by the untrusted kernel. So it is free
to map the same object or subject at any virtual address range. As a result, the sta-
bility of the approximation function cannot be guaranteed. For example, suppose
the kernel swaps the mappings of page 0x3000 and 0x4000. Subject 1’s access to
0x3000 will be allowed. However, the high-level object behind this address should
not be accessed by subject 1.
Some systems [68, 86, 67] are aware of this issue and implement certain runtime
measures such as checking the page table or providing its own set of guest page
table. The runtime measures are not satisfactory to maintain the approximation
function. First, it is costly for the hypervisor to traverse the guest page table, while
the concerned thread is hanging. Second, guest page table traversing is subject to
race condition attacks from the kernel, since the adversary may run on another CPU
core. More details about the race condition are discussed in Section 3.4.1. Although
the hypervisor can quiesce other cores as described in XMHF [93], it incurs a non-
negligible performance toll.
3.2.3 Issues in SP3
Given the approaches to represent the above two kinds of subjects, it is appropri-
ate to review a system that depends on both methods to control access to memory,
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which is the SP3 [101] system. This design causes identity issues. Note that SP3
is implemented on a para-virtualized platform, thus it involves some design that re-
quires hardware modification if implemented on a hardware-assisted virtualization
platform. Still, the discussion here focuses on the access control design, indepen-
dent from the implementation.
SP3 is a virtualization based system that aims to protect confidentiality of mem-
ory of application processes. Each process is assigned a SP3 domain with an iden-
tifier sid. Each virtual memory page of the process is assigned an identifier that
corresponds to a key. The hypervisor maintains an access matrix whose rows are
the domains and the columns are the key identifiers. If a domain s is assigned ac-
cess to a page p, the matrix records the authorization at (s,Kp) whereKp is the key







Figure 3.4: The Access Control Design of SP3
The original SP3 design is not explicitly aimed at enforcing a higher-level secu-
rity policy. Rather, it provides the mechanisms needed for potential security appli-
cations.
Suppose the mechanisms are used to enforce policy at the process level. In
this scenario, there are issues with both subject identity and object identity in this
design. The subjects are tracked by the hypervisor. Each domain is associated
with a secured context saved on one of the kernel stacks which contains the domain
identifier. During context switches, the hypervisor obtains the domain identifier of
the next domain from the exception frame saved during the previous exception on
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the kernel stack for that process. This approach is similar to the thread identification
above using kernel stack. Therefore, the kernel can supply another kernel stack
frame during context switch in order to fake to the domain identity.
The objects are essentially memory ranges grouped by key identifiers attached
to the Page Table Entries (PTEs). It is not clear from the original design that whether
the key identifiers in the PTEs are directly writable to the kernel, but still, they are
readable. If they are writable, the kernel is free to modify the key identifier in the
PTE of a virtual page to the key identifier of another process, so that the hypervisor
decrypts the memory content when accessing any page accessible via this PTE. If
they are not, the kernel can still modify the higher-level paging structure to replace
the entire mapping in that range with another domain’s leaf page table. Since page
table sharing is allowed, it is difficult for the hypervisor to verify the intention of this
modification. Still, the hypervisor will decrypt the pages because the key identifiers
in the leaf page table matches the the ones in the access matrix.
3.2.4 Privilege Level Based Subjects
A special case in tracking the subjects is to track kernel / user switches. Most
modern OS places the kernel in the same address space as the user applications
and leverages on the Current Privilege Level (CPL) feature of the hardware to iso-
late them. Therefore, tracking kernel / user switches is equivalent to tracking CPL
switches. This type of subjects is usually seen in the systems that enforces kernel
integrity, such as SecVisor [80]. An example effective policy is shown in Figure 3.5.
0x1000 – 0x2000 0x3000 0x4000
CPL = 0 X RW -
CPL = 3 - - R
Figure 3.5: The Effective Policy of Privilege Levels
In this case, the approximation function maps CPL 0 to kernel and CPL 3
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to others. The mapping itself is secure, because CPL is a hardware feature and
cannot be forged by software. However, the effectiveness of this kind of system
does not solely depend on CPL. The reason is that using CPL implies that any
code, regardless of its origin, running with CPL 0 is regarded as the kernel. This
implication leads to two consequences. First, to prevent return-to-user attacks, the
enforcement system needs to distinguish kernel memory and user memory in the
same address space, in order to prevent execution of code in user memory while
CPL is 0. This reduces the issue to the above memory range case and the same
issue applies. Second, to prevent illegal injection of code into kernel memory via
open interfaces such as kernel modules, such software level semantics needs to be
included as well. In Section 3.3.4, it is shown that software level semantics also
poses a challenge.
The recent speculative execution attacks, e.g. Meltdown [64] and Spectre [58],
drive Linux to turn to separate address spaces for kernel and user spaces [3]. In this
design, the kernel / user switch is equivalent to the address space switch above in
Section 3.2.1.
3.3 Utilization by Low-Level Mechanism
The enforcement systems rely on certain low-level mechanism which is the MMU
Therefore, in the second policy conversion stage described in Section 3.1, the effec-
tive policy is converted to a form necessitated by the low-level enforcement mecha-
nism, called binary policy. The format of binary policy is dictated by the low-level
mechanism. Our discussion in this section mainly uses the virtualization based sys-
tems as examples.
3.3.1 A General Approach
The low-level mechanism typically provide less than required number of subjects,
and can only enforce a subset of the high-level policy at any time. For example,
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the MMU essentially provides only one subject which is the hardware thread on the
CPU and the active policy enforced is the current address space mappings in the
page table. For enforcement of the full set of the policy, the high-level subjects are
dynamically bound to the low-level subjects. Accompanying the subject switches,
the active policy is dynamically switched as well. In the MMU case, the hardware
thread acts on behalf of one high-level subject at any time. And when the subject
switches, the page table also needs to be switched.
The implication is that it is required to divide up the access permissions assigned
for the various high-level subjects into sets. Each set is essentially a bag of tickets
for accesses to the objects allowed for a particular subject. In the MMU case, any
virtual address is a ticket, the corresponding physical address and the permission
assigned in the PTE control which object a subject can access with that ticket and
with what permission.
The general approach is, therefore, as follows. Ideally, the binary policy should
consist of sets with exactly the tickets allowed for a subject. By switching the active
bag of tickets along with the change of dynamic binding between the high-level
subjects and low-level subjects, the high-level policy is enforced and the complete
mediation requirement is satisfied.
The challenges posed by this approach are as following. Firstly, the division
of the access permissions requires semantics defined by the untrusted software, be-
cause the set of objects accessible to a subject is defined by the untrusted software.
At least, the subject needs to access itself as an object. Therefore, correct division of
permissions is a challenge. Note that because of this involvement, the binary policy
is also an approximation of the high-level policy.
Secondly, tracking the high-level subject switches also involves semantics out-
side of the trust boundary. Such tracking is not always straightforward because there
may be no low-level event that corresponds to the high-level semantics of subject
switch.
Thirdly, in order to mediate all the operations defined in the high-level policy,
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the low-level events that correspond to the operations need to be identified and in-
tercepted. In other words, the high-level operations need to be synthesized. Because
not all low-level events are relevant, policy mediation requires semantics of the un-
trusted software to filter the irrelevant ones. As a result, mediating the high-level
events at the low-level is a challenge.
The impact of these challenges is presented in the rest of the section.
3.3.2 Division into Binary Policy Sets
In virtualization based systems, the binary policy is the paging structures needed by
the MMU. In order to divide up the effective policy to sets of paging structures, the
hypervisor needs to establish a number of relations between the virtual addresses
in the effective policy and the physical addresses that points to the objects. Once
established, the objects accessible to a subject are added to its bag.
In hardware-assisted virtualization, there are two stages in MMU’s address
translation. The VA to guest physical address (GPA) translation is the first, and
the GPA to PA translation is the second. During the policy division, an important
task that the hypervisor needs to perform is to find the GPAs so that the correct EPT
entry can be located to fill the permissions. In order to acquire the GPAs, the guest
page tables need to be traversed. However, the guest page tables are outside of the
trust boundary, therefore, semantics outside of the trust boundary is used.
In fact, the division of the effective policy into bags of tickets can be imple-
mented at either stage. In other words, the inclusion of the objects accessible into
a subject’s binary policy set can be achieved by configuring either the guest page
table or the EPT. This option drives two different types of design. In the first type,
the subjects are still distinguished and restricted by the guest page table. It implies
that the EPT is shared among all the subjects and contains a union of all the objects
and permissions assigned to all the subjects. In this design, one bag corresponds to
one set of guest page table. InkTag [51], SeCage [67] and Fides [86] are example
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systems that adopt this design. The second design is that the subjects are restricted
using individual EPT sets. The guest page tables are typically directly reused. In
this design, one bag corresponds to one set of EPT. TrustVisor [68] and AppShield
[29] are both systems that adopt this design.
Nevertheless, both types involve the semantics outside the trust boundary which
is the mappings in the guest page table, although the specific consequence depends
on the way that such semantics is utilized. The consequences are below.
Shared EPT The systems that follow this design can be further divided into
two subtypes. The first subtype directly reuses the guest page tables, as shown by
SeCage [67]. The second subtype constructs a separate set of guest page table that
contains replicated and verified mappings from the set of guest page table provided
by the untrusted kernel. This type is represented by InkTag [51] and Fides [86].
The first subtype is not secure because of the race condition attacks described
in Section 3.4.1. The consequence is that, the attempted to check the mappings
in the guest page table can be defeated. The guest OS can inject or modify the
mapping by modifying the guest page tables. Such modification alters the mapping
of a virtual address to another physical address, thereby destroy the stability of the
approximation function.
The second subtype replicates the mappings in the guest page table and verifies
them, before writing the mappings into the guest page tables constructed by the
hypervisor. The latter guest page tables are always used when the intended subject
is executing. They also remain unchanged unless requested by the protected subject.
Therefore, the above issues do not affect them. However, existing schemes are still
vulnerable to the attacks related to permission revocation discussed in Section 3.4.2.
The consequence is that the guest page tables provided by the hypervisor can still
be modified.
Exclusive EPT This approach ensures that there exists only active mapping for
one subject in each EPT set. However, there is still the issue of directly reusing the
guest page table. The similar issues to the first subtype above apply.
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Attacking Inaccurate Conversion
It should be noted that during the second conversion stage, the EPT arrangement
needs to exactly follow the intended policy. If the subjects are intended to be sep-
arated from each other, the EPT sets are not allowed to contain mappings to the
same physical memory. Unfortunately, SeCage [67] places EPT mappings to the
shared data segment of the application in the EPT for the secret compartments and
the untrusted compartment. In other words, the application semantics outside of the
trust domain requires access to the data segment and this need is accommodated by
the EPT. The design is shown in Figure 3.6.
Data Mapping
Secret Mapping
Untrusted Compartment Secure Compartment
Figure 3.6: The EPT Arrangement in SeCage
This shared region between the secret compartment and untrusted compartment
become a potential ground for leaking secrets in the secret compartment. The at-
tacker can attempt to induce the code in the secret compartment to read the secret
and write to the shared memory which is readable by the untrusted compartment.
3.3.3 Detecting Subject Switches
The second challenge in Section 3.3.1 concerns switching active policy along with
the subject switches on the CPU. The subject switches are also semantics beyond
the trust boundary. The enforcement systems need to monitor every switch, and
follow up with policy switches, which requires the enforcement systems to obtain
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semantics outside of the trust boundary. If certain switch is missed, the applied
policy may be wrong, thereby undermining complete mediation.
Depending on the type of subjects that needs to be tracked, the amount of se-
mantics involves also differs. For process subjects, it is straightforward to track the
switches, because it is a straightforward for a hypervisor to track CR3 switches.
However, for other types of subjects, more semantics is involved and there are po-
tentially more issues.
Subject Switch within an Address Space
Certain virtualization based systems enforce policies that concern about finer-
grained entities than an entire address space. Assume the entity of concern is a
consecutive range R in the address space. Different policies are applied to R and
other parts of the address space. Therefore, it is necessary to detect when the ex-
ecution switches between R and the rest. Take the policy in Section 3.2.2 as an
example, R may be between 0xA000 and 0x1A000.
It is challenging to detect such switches because they do not necessarily in-
cur any events defined in the hypervisor’s trust boundary. In essence, this type of
switches are control flow transfers which are not within the original design consid-
erations of the hypervisor. Nevertheless, there are two workarounds proposed in the
literature.
In the first method, the hypervisor disables the execution permission of all mem-
ory pages, except those for R. As a result, whenever the execution leaves R, an
access violation is reported by the MMU and the control then traps to the hypervi-
sor. However, this method have a hidden issue. Before the hypervisor applies the
binary policy sets, the hypervisor has to know exactly the boundary of R, which
requires the semantics in the guest page tables. Therefore, this method depends on
the correct construction of the binary policy sets which is discussed in Section 3.3.2.
The second method is to arrange the subjects to actively signal the switches. As
used in SeCage [67], the entry and exit ofR are instrumented with code that invokes
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the VMFUNC instruction to switch the underlying EPT.
Attacking Un-mediated Subject Switch However, this method is not secure
because the subject switches completely evade the mediation of the hypervisor. As
a result, there is no guarantee that the hypervisor enforces complete isolation among
the subjects. In other words, certain state switches are left to the protected applica-
tion itself. Amongst the states, the secure stack used by the secret compartment is
of particular concern. In SeCage’s design, the trampoline and springboard are code
fragments used to perform the state switches between the secure compartments and
the untrusted compartments. The fragments contain instructions that replace the
stack according to the direction of the switch. A malicious kernel can intercept the
instructions and emulate them, e.g. by using break points. During the emulation,
a wrong stack pointer is moved to ESP, so that the secure compartment uses the
kernel supplied stack. The kernel then skips the emulated instruction on return. The
execution continues to the secure compartment and the secure compartment uses
the insecure stack.
3.3.4 Event Synthesis
Since the binary policy needs to faithfully enforce the high-level policy, all the op-
erations performed on the objects need to be intercepted. As introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3.1, the approach is to capture the low-level events that could be an indication
of the high-level operations and filter the irrelevant ones. In essence, the enforce-
ment system needs to construct a set SE which consists of pairs (e, v), in which e
refers to a particular low-level event, while v is a combination of the trusted states.
The element in SE are chosen so that when a low-level event e occurs, if the trusted
states match the value v, a high-level event is uniquely identified. SE is included in
the approximation function.
The main issue is that e may not even be triggered when certain high-level op-
eration occurs. Plus, in order to specify v, the enforcement systems need to reuse
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the semantics outside of the trust boundary to interpret the states also outside of the
trust boundary. The interpretation may be misled because the untrusted software
manipulated the states.
High-Level Software Events
The most prominent example is the software level event: dynamic allocation of
memory. This type of events are of interest, because they can imply policy updates
when the newly created object is of security concern. The typical approach to ac-
quire the software level semantics is to insert an agent into the software. The agent
hooks the concerned code that “handles” the event to intercept the invocation. Then
it explicitly calls the enforcement system to inform the captured event. For integrity,
the memory page where the hooks reside are set as read-only.
With this approach, much software semantics outside of the trust boundary is
included in the approximation function. Examples include but not limited to the
virtual memory layout, the one-to-one relation from the invocation of certain code
to the concerned event, the parameters and the stack layout etc. Any manipulation
in these leads to incorrect approximation of the software events, thus undermines
the complete mediation requirement.
Hook Bypassing Without eliciting too much software level details, here
presents an issue with the hooking technique. Although the hooks are set as read-
only, there is still no guarantee that all invocation of the hooked function is inter-
cepted. The reason is that the invocation is made via virtual address but the read-
only permission must be set on GPA. A malicious kernel can simply copy the page
that contain the hooks, and maps the virtual address to the copy. The hooks are
never triggered while the hooked application runs normally.
To defend against this kind of attack, the guest page tables need to be monitored
and tracked. However, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, checking the guest page table
faces the race condition issue and is not always secure.
The above approach is adopted by systems such as HUKO [99] which enforce
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a mandatory access control model. In order to label all objects, it is necessary for
these systems to track all allocations and deallocations in the kernel space. HUKO
inserts a protected and trusted component into the kernel itself to intercept the al-
location and deallocation events and notify the hypervisor. Other systems that per-
forms stealthy debugging [37, 41] also potentially face this issue when the kernel
is malicious, although in their original design, they do not explicitly consider the
kernel to be malicious.
3.4 The Impact of Concurrency
3.4.1 Race Conditions
Concurrent access by multiple cores could lead to race conditions. They pose a
threat because the semantics could be manipulated unexpectedly. In a multicore
setting, walking the guest page table at runtime is not secure because it is subjects
to race condition attacks. On a single core system, the guest OS is paused when the
CPU traps to the hypervisor so the problem does not exist. However, on a multicore
system, when one core traps to the hypervisor or execute the isolated code, the guest
OS on other cores are still running. So there is ample opportunity for the guest OS to
manipulate the guest page table when the hypervisor is walking it or when isolated
code is using it for translation.
Specifically, the effective policies enforced by the hypervisor use virtual ad-
dresses (VA), because user space programs in general are not aware of any physical
addresses. In the second policy conversion stage, the hypervisor faces the chal-
lenging problem which is to find out the corresponding GPA so that the right EPT
entry can be updated accordingly. In order to do so, the hypervisor needs to traverse
the guest page tables of the virtual addresses at runtime in order to find the GPA.
Software page table traversing cannot be done instantaneously. During its traversal,
the kernel can modify the page table entries and feed the hypervisor with a wrong
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mapping.
Consider that the hypervisor attempts to lock the guest page table as an example.
Walking page table is a rather lengthy operation because it involves a number of
memory loads and stores. Thus, the guest OS running on another core has a non-
negligible time window to change one of the leaf page tables after it is verified. In
order to do so, the guest simply needs to write a few bytes into the higher-level page.
The result is that the hypervisor ends up protecting the wrong physical page, while
another page is actually used to perform VA-to-GPA mapping.
3.4.2 Permission Revocation
Even if the binary policy are correctly constructed, there is still a need to perform
revocation once the active policies are switched or when policy update happens.
The revocation needs to be complete in that any component that could hold a copy
of the permission needs to be considered, including any buffers system-wide.
In virtualization based systems, the address translation is part of the binary pol-
icy. Meanwhile, recently used address translations together with the permissions
are cached in modern CPU’s Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). The caching re-
sults in implicit replication of the binary policy. Such replication causes undesired
consequences when a multicore platform is considered.
Unlike data cache and instruction cache, the consistency between the TLB and
the page tables in the main memory is maintained by the software, instead of the
hardware. Therefore, when an address mapping is updated, the software needs to
explicitly invalidate corresponding TLB entry.
Moreover, the hardware does not enforce coherence among the TLBs on differ-
ent cores. All such operations need to be explicitly carried out by software as well.
When more than one core access an address space, the core that changes the map-
ping is supposed to perform TLB shootdown to invalidate any existing entries on
other cores. Typically, it is achieved by using the Interprocessor Interrupts (IPIs).
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Specifically, the initiating core fires an IPI to each core that needs to invalidate its
TLBs. On modern x86 platforms, the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) interfaces with the bus for receiving and sending IPIs. The IPI is received by
the other cores and treated exactly the same way as an external interrupt. A handler
is invoked and the specified TLB entry is invalidated. In this way, the consistent
view of the address space is maintained across all CPU cores.
3.4.3 TLB-Related Attacks
There are two attacks that can be launched on a multicore platform by exploiting
the TLB. The first is the stifling attack that actively abuses the TLB and IPI across
CPUs. The second exploits a hardware performance feature called Virtual Processor
ID (VPID) to keep stale entries. The attacks are performed on two open-source
micro-hypervisors, BitVisor [82] and XMHF [93], running on a PC with multiple
cores.
In the attacks, consider a typical isolation scenario where the hypervisor receives
the request from a security sensitive application at runtime, and then sets the read-
only permission in the EPT entry for the application’s code page. The objective
of the attacks is for the malicious OS to successfully modify the protected page
without the write permission on the EPT entry. The general idea behind the attacks
is to use a stale TLB entry so that the core continue to use the write permission
granted before the EPT update.
The Stifling Attack
The stifling attack prevents the CPU core controlled by the malicious thread from
responding to the hypervisor’s TLB shootdown, so that its stale TLB entry is not in-
validated. Note that trapping to the hypervisor cannot be denied by setting the inter-
rupt masking bit (namely EFLAGS.IF), because the hardware ignores it whenever
the External-interrupt Exiting bit in the Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS)
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is set.
The attack exploits a hardware design feature to block all maskable external
interrupts, including the IPI used for TLB shootdown. According to the hard-
ware specification, the IPI handler is expected to perform a write to the End Of
Interrupt (EOI) register in the local APIC before executing an iret instruc-
tion. The EOI write operation signals the end of the current interrupt handling and
allows the local APIC to deliver the next IPI message (if any) to the core. If no such
write is performed, the local APIC withholds subsequent IPIs and never delivers
them. The guest can access the physical APIC because in hypervisors for memory
isolation, the APIC is typically not virtualized in order to minimize the TCB.
As depicted in Figure 3.7, suppose that the victim application occupies corev
while two malicious kernel threads occupy core1 and core2. The attack steps are
described below.
1. At corev: The victim application starts to run and writes data into a memory
buffer.
2. At core1: The malicious kernel maps the guest physical address of the buffer
into its own address space by changing its guest page table. It reads the buffer
so that the corresponding EPT entry is loaded in the TLB of core1. It also
disables interrupt and preemption so that it is not scheduled off from core1 in
order to avoid any TLB invalidation due to events within the guest.
3. At core2: Another thread of the malicious kernel sends an IPI to core1 by
using a legitimate IPI vector for OS synchronization.
4. At core1: The malicious IPI handler returns without writing to the EOI reg-
ister of the local APIC. As a result, subsequent IPIs are never accepted by
core1.
5. At corev: The victim issues a hypercall for memory protection. The hypervi-
sor updates the EPT for all other cores to disallow accesses. It broadcasts an
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IPI to trigger VM exit on other cores.
6. At core1: The IPI from corev is not delivered to core1. The kernel thread
can continue to read/write the isolated data buffer without trigger any EPT
violation, because the core’s MMU uses the EPT entry in the TLB which has

















Figure 3.7: Illustration of the stifling attack bypassing the EPT’s access control over
the victim’s data. The attacker controls core1 and core2.
The attack is implemented on BitVisor [82] with necessary changes including
new code to change EPT permission bits for isolation and an interrupt handler for
TLB shootdown. The experiment shows that the kernel successfully writes to the
protected buffer, even though the access permission in the corresponding EPT entry
has been changed into read-only.
One possible countermeasure to the stifling attack is to virtualize local APICs so
that the hypervisor intercepts the external interrupts and enforces EOI writes. How-
ever, this approach not only increases the hypervisor’s code size and complexity,
but also has performance tolls as it is recommended to remove the hypervisor from
the code path handling interrupts for better efficiency [48, 91].
An alternative is to resort to non-maskable interrupts (NMIs) instead of IPIs.
NMIs are delivered immediately by the local APIC to the CPU core as they are
usually sent by hardware such as watchdogs to indicate critical hardware failure
which needs immediate attention. However, it is strongly discouraged to use soft-
ware to generate NMIs because of its complex handling. Moreover, it requires a
high level of expertise to implement a proper NMI handler [77] because it needs to
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deal with recursive execution. Briefly speaking, once an NMI is delivered to a core,
subsequent NMIs are blocked until the core executes iret. If the NMI handler
causes any exception, the exception handler’s iret immediately allows the next
NMI to be delivered while the present one is still in processing. From the system
perspective, it is risky to use the hypervisor to issue and handle NMIs.
Virtual Processor ID (VPID) Attack
XMHF [93] is an open-source micro-hypervisor on x86 platforms that explicitly
takes the multicore setting into its design consideration. To deal with concurrency
in the hypervisor space, XMHF enforces a single threaded execution model for
the hypervisor. When one core is trapped to the hypervisor space, it “quiesces
all other cores” by broadcasting a Non-maskable Interrupt (NMI) which triggers a
VM exit and effectively pauses the execution of all other threads across the system.
Therefore, it is not subject to the stifling attack. Nevertheless, it still has another
TLB-related vulnerability.
Recent generations of x86 processors introduce a feature called Virtual Proces-
sor ID (VPID) to avoid unnecessary TLB invalidation induced by VM exit events.
Identifiers are assigned to address spaces of each virtual CPU and of the hypervisor
and tagged to their TLB entries. When a TLB entry is used during translation, it is
considered a hit only when its VPID tag matches the VPID of the present address
space. With this extra checking, the hardware does not need to invalidate all TLB
entries during VM exit.
Although improving the performance, this technology has an unexpected secu-
rity side effect. Since not all TLB entries are evicted by the hardware during a VM
exit, the stale entries of the guest must be explicitly invalidated by the hypervisor.
However, the XMHF hypervisor neglects this issue. It assigns VPID 0 to the hy-
pervisor and VPID 1 to the guest. Unfortunately, there is no explicit invalidation of
TLB entries tagged with VPID 1 when handling the quiesce-NMI. With this loop-
hole, the following attack can be launched by the guest OS to write the page set as
52
read-only by the EPTs. The system setting is the same as the stifling attack shown
in Figure 3.7.
1. At corev: The victim application starts execution. It allocates a page and
requests memory isolation.
2. At core1: The malicious kernel running on core1 maps the buffer into its own
space, reads it once so that a TLB entry is loaded by the MMU. It disables
interrupt and preemption so that the TLB entry is not evicted by events in the
guest.
3. At corev: The victim application performs a hypercall to the XMHF hypervi-
sor. The hypervisor issues an NMI to trap other cores and sets the read-only
permission bit in the relevant EPT entry after CPU quiesce.
4. At corev: The execution returns to the victim application.
5. At core1: The guest OS resumes its execution. Due to incomplete TLB inval-
idation, the stale entry is not removed. The guest OS continues to read and
write the page, regardless of the permission in the current EPT.
The implementation involves a hypervisor application, or hypapp in XMHF’s
terminology, based on XMHF APIs. The hypapp takes an address of a physical
page as input and sets its access permission in EPTs as read-only. The hypapp is
invoked via a hypercall from an application bound to a core. The kernel runs a
malicious thread on another core to continuously access the page. It is observed
that the malicious thread keeps a stale TLB entry and successfully writes the target
page without triggering EPT violation.
3.4.4 Implications
The revocation issue impacts all systems that reuse memory pages previously used
by the untrusted guest. If the memory pages contain sensitive data itself such as
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[68, 67, 29, 86], the guest can directly access the data with stale permission. If the
memory pages with data are encrypted as in InkTag [51], the guest kernel can still
manipulate the guest page tables used by isolated execution, i.e. the hypervisor page
table in InkTag’s term. These page tables are allocated by the kernel and handed
over to the hypervisor, therefore, permission revocation is needed. Even though
InkTag verifies the guest page tables and do not directly reuse them, its security is
still undermined.
3.5 Discussions
In this section, a few related issues about the mismatch in scope of semantics and
policy enforcement are discussed.
3.5.1 Memory Monitors
The discussion in previous sections can be applied to monitor systems and virtual
machine introspection (VMI) systems. Copilot [71], KI-Mon [60] and Vigilare [70]
are example systems that utilize a separate hardware component for monitoring pur-
poses. Such hardware-based monitors are proposed to monitor kernel code integrity,
static data integrity and kernel objects. The VMI systems [84, 81, 24, 49, 42, 50]
leverage the hypervisor’s support to introspect the memory states of virtual ma-
chines.
These systems do not necessarily enforce any policy regarding the subjects such
as processes. However, they are concerned about the objects. Also, all the systems
are isolated for the tamper-proof requirement. Therefore, the possible mismatch be-
tween the semantics within the trust boundary and the semantics needed to monitor
the objects still exists. Thus, the discussion about involvement of semantics outside
of the trust boundary in the approximation function, and the effect on object identity
















Figure 3.8: The enforcement system in the monitor scenario
Figure 3.8 presents a conceptual illustration of the monitor systems. The high-
level object list undergoes two stages of conversion, marked as arrow 1 and arrow
2 in the figure. In the first stage, the high-level objects are converted to their corre-
sponding addresses at runtime, i.e. virtual addresses. In the second stage, the virtual
addresses are further converted to physical addresses so that the low-level mecha-
nism can directly monitor. The low-level mechanism differs depending on the spe-
cific system. The hardware-based monitors use Direct Memory Access (DMA) or
bus sniffing, while the VMI systems rely on the MMU.
There are two major issues in these systems. First, the semantics in the kernel
page table plays an important role. Second, the isolation in these systems removes
the possibility to interpose on important events in the CPU. Therefore, these systems
may not be able to respond to state changes and miss the monitor target.
Kernel Page Table Since the kernel under monitor still controls the full set of
page table, the monitors may be presented a completely false view of the entities
that it is monitoring. The existing approach is to assume certain virtual memory
layout that is normally followed by the kernel under monitor. This approach in
essence does not attempt to verify the use of the semantics beyond the trust bound-
ary. Worse, the page table can even be modified by legitimate means. For example,
the kfork() system call is a legitimate way provided by Linux kernel to load a
new kernel image. Afterwards, the system soft-reboots to run using the new image,
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while leaving the old kernel image intact in physical memory. Once executed, the
monitors, which still read the old image, will be unaware of the new kernel.
CPU States The memory monitors are not designed with the capability of track-
ing activities on the CPU. Especially so are the hardware monitors, because they are
separated from the CPU. A malicious kernel may modify the CPU states to violate
fundamental assumptions and mislead the monitoring, e.g. by modifying the paging
mode or even turning on virtualization.
3.5.2 Runtime Updates and Policy Coherence
Since multiple binary policy sets may contain access permissions to the same object,
the enforcement systems need to ensure that the binary policy sets are coherent, i.e.
in accordance with the high-level policy and do not conflict with each other. For
example, if the policy states that only subject X has access to a certain page P ,
only the EPT for X should allow access to page P ; all other EPTs should deny
such access. Otherwise, there may be contradicting rules in different policies which
confuse the hypervisor during enforcement.
However, since the access permissions are scattered in the binary policy sets,
the enforcement systems usually face a daunting task of enumerate all of the sets to
ensure coherence. Beside the obvious performance implications, the ambiguity in
the policy may also hamper effective verification.
3.5.3 Functionality
An ideal enforcement system maintains full compatibility with existing functionali-
ties, which requires them to understand the rich semantics in the untrusted software.
One of the functionality often left unaddressed is swapping. An important aspect
of virtual memory is that the backing page for a virtual page can be freely swapped
out and in by the guest OS. Therefore, the guest OS do have legitimately reasons
to access the data. Except InkTag [51], existing systems do not describe explicitly
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how their policy enforcement can cooperate with swapping.
Swapping is an interesting issue because it provides the guest OS a chance to
freely modify both the content in a swapped page and the mappings defined in the
guest page table when a page is swapped in. Integrity protection on the page content
is not enough, and the guest OS must also be checked so that it places a page at
its original location. The paraverification-style of verification does not apply here
because there is no application to specify the intention; swapping is purely initiated
by the kernel. It suggests certain deep interaction is needed between the hypervisor
and the guest OS and this remains an open question.
3.5.4 Forced Serialization of Concurrent Accesses
The compatibility with swapping introduces another unexpected effect. The feature
of InkTag’s approach is that it allows read access to all the physical page via both
EPTs. In other words, instead of denying access via the untrusted EPT, it separates
the physical memory into two mutually exclusive sets which are both readable: a
trusted set and an untrusted set. The content of a page is encrypted when it is
mapped in the untrusted set, and decrypted in the trusted set. The hypervisor en-
crypts and decrypts the page content when switching the set that a page is mapped
in. The switch is triggered by guest access. When the page is not mapped in the set
that the guest attempts to access, the EPT page fault is handled by the hypervisor
and the page’s set is switched.
This approach is effective on unicore platforms, however, it cannot be scaled
to multicore platforms. Because the sets are exclusive, there cannot be concur-
rent accesses from more than one core via different EPTs. The hypervisor needs
to serialize such accesses and the cores need to wait until the other cores finish.
Therefore, this approach introduces significant overhead and is not scalable. The
hypervisor can optimize and keep two read-only copies of the same page so that
read access can happen concurrently. However, writes from the trusted view still
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have to be intercepted and synchronized by the hypervisor, which requires the hy-
pervisor to decrypt the page first, perform the synchronization and encrypt the page
again. These operations are still not efficient.
3.6 Possible Solutions
The root cause of the aforementioned issues is the mismatch between the semantic
information available within the trust boundary and beyond. The solutions should
address this root cause. The following discusses a few possible directions.
3.6.1 Expanding the Trust Boundary
The traditional reference monitor inside the OS kernel such as SELinux [83] does
not suffer from the problem because the trust boundary, i.e. the user/kernel bound-
ary, encompasses all needed semantics. Therefore, there is no mismatch in semantic
scope. However, expanding the trust boundary to the user/kernel boundary faces the
drawback that the kernel contains a huge TCB.
The TCB issue can be potentially remedied by privilege separation. The extreme
form of privilege separation is to resort to a microkernel. However, this approach
likely encounters practical barriers of converting existing infrastructure to another.
Nested Kernel [36] attempts to strike a balance without drastically modifying the
architecture, however, its design only includes page tables inside the trust boundary.
Other kernel semantics is not covered.
3.6.2 Self-Supplied Semantics
It is also possible for the enforcement systems to resort to alternative designs. The
pursuit for small TCB drives the design in many systems towards the direction that
still leaves all resource management to the untrusted kernel. The enforcement sys-
tems only try to deprive the kernel access to resources that previously belong to it.
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Therefore, the enforcement systems all need to understand the internal working of
the untrusted kernel, thus the semantics causes issue.
In an alternative design, the enforcement systems can perform some light-weight
resource management. The untrusted guest software is only utilized as a library and
only handles tokens to the real resources. The semantics is still controlled by the
enforcement systems, with the benefits of rich functionality from existing software.
SecPod [98] hints on this approach in that the hypervisor manages the entire
paging structures including the guest page tables. The kernel’s computation about
address mapping is recorded in shadow page tables never used for policy enforce-
ment. Therefore, the VA to GPA mapping is controlled. However, the control does
not extend beyond the mappings in SecPod’s design. The design presented in the
next Chapter, FIMCE, also falls into this category.
3.6.3 Hardware Assistance
Another option is to seek assistance from hardware. If the scope of semantics in
the hardware is aligned with the high-level policy, the burden on the enforcement
system is minimized. Thus, the issues incurred by the misalignment can be greatly
alleviated.
An example can be seen in the design of SGX. Although the address space lay-
out is designated to the untrusted kernel, the hardware records VA to PA mappings
when the enclaves are constructed. On every subsequent memory access, the hard-
ware compares the VA and the PA used by the access and the recorded version. The
access is only allowed if there is a match. SGX hardware understands the semantics
about the virtual address space, therefore, it can perform the checks in hardware.
The drawback of this approach is also obvious, though. Since hardware modifica-
tion is needed, legacy platform cannot benefit from the new design.
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3.6.4 Restricting Untrusted Software
Lastly, it is an option to impose restrictions on the untrusted software so that the
semantics outside of the trust boundary can only behave in expected ways.
The paraverification idea in the design of InkTag offers certain insight into a
software-only approach to restricting the untrusted software. The kernel’s modifi-
cation on the address space of the isolated application must be coupled by a token
supplied by the initiating application. The hypervisor verifies the intention repre-
sented by the token and the action performed by the kernel. If they match, the
modification is allowed. However, this design needs to be specially adapted for
individual types of semantics. For example, special design may be needed for op-
erations on files. It remains an open challenge to design a generic and practical
verification mechanism in software.
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Chapter 4
Enforcing Isolation with Fully
Isolated Micro-Computing
Environment (FIMCE)
In this chapter, a new isolation paradigm is proposed to enclose an entire com-
puting environment including the CPU core, the memory region, and (optionally)
the needed peripheral device(s). The new system is named as fully isolated micro-
computing environment or FIMCE. It avoids all aforementioned security pitfalls of
virtualization-based memory isolation, constructs a secure isolated execution envi-
ronment with less than 1% of overhead. The principle of FIMCE is to control the in-
volvement of the kernel semantics in the isolation policy enforcement. Meanwhile,
FIMCE performs minimum resource management so that necessary semantics is
provided by itself.
The Software Guard Extension (SGX) to the x86 architecture is a hardware
based isolated environment and offers strong isolation guarantees. SGX allows ap-
plications to create so-called enclaves as an isolated environment within its address
space. Once created, only code inside an enclave is able to access memory assigned
to the enclave. All other accesses are not allowed, including SMM. While the iso-
lation guarantee of SGX is strong, certain capability is still not included such as the
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ability to perform I/O. In this chapter, a comparison of FIMCE and SGX is given
and potential ways to integrate both for strong security guarantees are discussed.
4.1 FIMCE Architecture
In a nutshell, a FIMCE is an isolated computing environment dynamically set up by
the hypervisor to protect a security task. The hypervisor enforces the isolation be-
tween the guest and a FIMCE by using virtualization techniques. A FIMCE consists
of the minimal hardware and software satisfying the task’s execution needs. Its de-
fault hardware consists of a vCPU core, a segment of main memory and a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) chip. If requested, peripheral devices (e.g., a keyboard)
can be assigned to a FIMCE as well. These hardware resources are exclusively used
by the task when it is running inside its FIMCE.
The code running inside a FIMCE consists of a piece of housekeeping code
called the FIMCE manager and the software components that comprise a set of
pillars, as well as the security task itself. A pillar is in essence a self-contained
library the security task’s execution depends on. For instance, a TPM pillar provides
the TPM support to the task. A FIMCE hosts a single thread of execution starting
from the entry of the FIMCEmanager. All code in a FIMCE runs in Ring 0 and calls
each other via function calls. Hence, there is no context switches within a FIMCE.
Core Isolation The vCPU core used by the protected task is isolated from the
untrusted OS for two reasons. Firstly, it prevents the hypervisor from understanding
the kernel’s scheduling semantics which causes a series of issues as discussed in
the previous chapter. Secondly, it prevents untrusted OS from interfering with the
FIMCE by using the inter-core communication mechanisms such as INIT signals.
In modern systems, such signals can be triggered via programming the APIC. Note
that core isolation does not mean that a physical CPU core is permanently dedicated
to a protected task. In fact, the task can migrate from one core to another. However,
while it is running, it exclusively occupies the vCPU and does not share it with other
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threads, until it voluntarily yields the control or is terminated by the hypervisor.
In addition, the hypervisor sets up the virtual core of the isolated environment
such that external interrupts, NMI, INIT signal and SIPI are all trapped to the hy-
pervisor. By default, INIT and SIPI automatically trigger VM exit. To intercept
NMI, the hypervisor sets the NMI exiting bit in the pin-based VM-Execution con-
trol bitmap of the VMCS structure. To handle external interrupts including possible
IPIs, empty interrupt handlers are installed by the hypervisor inside the FIMCE,
while the security task may choose to replace them with its own handlers to manage
peripheral devices.
Memory Isolation Memory isolation is still indispensable in FIMCE design.
FIMCE guarantees that the entire address translation process is out of the guest
kernel’s reach. All data structures used in the translation process such as the guest
page table and the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) are separated from the kernel.
Moreover, the physical memory pages used by a FIMCE are allocated from a pool
of pages priorly reserved by the hypervisor. Using reserved memory pages controls
the involvement of kernel semantics about the relation between identity and memory
pages. It deprives the kernel of the chance to influence the mappings used inside
the FIMCE. Therefore, the issues about the involvement of kernel semantics about
object identities are avoided.
Different from conventional virtual machines, it is not necessary to turn on mem-
ory virtualization for the FIMCE. Without any EPT, the FIMCE’s MMU uses the
page table to translate a virtual address directly to a physical address. The main
benefits of the setting are to save the hypervisor’s workload of managing EPTs and
to speed up FIMCE’s memory access. Figure 4.1 explains the memory setting for a
FIMCE.
When launching a FIMCE, the hypervisor sets up the page table according to
the parameters that describe the virtual address space. To prevent the code in the
FIMCE from accidentally or maliciously accessing pages outside of the isolated re-













Figure 4.1: Memory isolation for FIMCE without EPT
address mapping is fixed. For this purpose, the page table does not have mappings
to its own physical pages and updates to the CR3 register and other control registers
are trapped to the hypervisor. (Note that different paging modes make different in-
terpretation of the same paging structure, which may introduce loopholes that allow
the FIMCE code to breach memory isolation.) Lastly, the hypervisor configures
Input-Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) page tables to prevent illegal
DMA accesses.
I/O Device Isolation FIMCE utilizes DMA remapping and interrupt remapping
supported by hardware based I/O virtualization, together with VMCS configuration
and EPTs to ensure that the FIMCE has exclusive accesses to peripheral devices
assigned to it. Firstly, any I/O command issued from the guest to the FIMCE device
should be blocked. For port I/O devices, the hypervisor sets the corresponding bits
in the guest’s I/O bitmap. For MemoryMapped I/O (MMIO) devices, the hypervisor
configures the guest’s EPTs to intercept accesses to the MMIO region of the device.
Secondly, interrupts and data produced by a FIMCE device are only bound to the
FIMCE core. For this purpose, the hypervisor configures the translation tables used
by DMA and interrupt remapping. The former redirects DMA accesses from the
device to the memory region inside the FIMCE and the latter ensures that interrupts
from the device are delivered to the FIMCE core rather than other cores of the guest.
4.2 The Lifecycle of FIMCE
When the platform is powered on, its DRTM is invoked to load and measure the hy-
pervisor which in turn launches the guest OS. A FIMCE is launched only when the
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hypervisor receives a hypercall to protect a security task. After the task finishes its
job, it issues another hypercall within the FIMCE to request FIMCE shutdown. The
following describes the main procedures the hypervisor performs during FIMCE
launch, runtime and termination.
4.2.1 FIMCE Bootup
The hypervisor’s main tasks here are to allocate the needed hardware resources and
to set up the environment for the security task.
Hardware resource allocation The default FIMCE hardware resources com-
prise a CPU core, a set of physical memory pages, and the TPM chip. To make
a graceful core ownership handover from the guest to the FIMCE, the guest OS’s
CPU hot-plug facility is utilized to remove a physical core from the guest. To un-
plug a core, the kernel migrates all processes, kernel threads and IRQ handlers to
other cores and only leaves on the core the idle task which puts the CPU to sus-
pension. The kernel also configures the unplugged core’s local APIC so that local
interrupts are masked. Note that the guest OS cannot prevent the hypervisor from
gaining control of a core after a hypercall. After removal, the (benign) kernel will
not attempt to use the unplugged core any longer. The hypervisor then allocates a
new VMCS for the logical core of the FIMCE and initializes the VMCS control bits
such that core isolation takes effect once the FIMCE starts execution.
The physical memory used by the FIMCE is allocated by the hypervisor from
a reserved memory frame pool so that they are not accessible from the guest. Note
that the dynamic memory allocation approach adopted by existing systems is not
secure due to the stifling attack. Suppose one page is allocated inside the guest
and later isolated for use by FIMCE, in order to isolate the page, any existing TLB
entry for that page needs to be invalidated. However, due to the stifling attack, such
invalidation is not always possible.
To setup for the FIMCE’s access to the TPM chip, the hypervisor blocks other
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cores’ access to the TPM’s MMIO registers by configuring the EPT. The FIMCE
may also contain peripheral devices. If the security task requires accesses to a pe-
ripheral device, the hypervisor leverages the IOMMU’s capability to redirect DMA
accesses and interrupts to ensure the FIMCE’s exclusive ownership. The hypervisor
also configures the I/O bitmap in the guest’s VMCS to intercept any guest access
to the device through Port I/O, and configures the EPT for accesses to the MMIO
regions. The hard disk is not considered in the design because disk data can easily
be protected by cryptographic means.
Environment Initialization After all hardware resources are allocated, the hy-
pervisor sets up the FIMCE environment for the task’s code to run inside. Firstly,
the hypervisor initializes a minimum set of data structures required by the hardware
architecture. These include a Global Descriptor Table (GDT) with a code segment
descriptor, a data segment descriptor and a task-state segment (TSS) descriptor. The
design uses simple flat descriptors for both code and data segments. The descrip-
tors are configured with a Descriptor Privilege Level (DPL) of 0, which means that
all FIMCE code runs with Ring 0 privilege. There is no adverse consequence to
elevate the FIMCE code’s privilege, because it cannot access the guest or the hy-
pervisor space due to full isolation. It cannot attack other FIMCE instances neither,
because each FIMCE instance is independent of each other and is launched with a
clean state.
An Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is also initialized with entries pointing to
empty interrupt handlers. With the IDT, proper interrupt handlers can be installed
if the security task requests I/O support. In addition, the hypervisor sets up the
page table for the FIMCE. The hypervisor also flushes the FIMCE core’s TLB to
invalidate all existing entries. Lastly, it properly fills in the VMCS fields to complete
environment initialization.
Code Loading The hypervisor first loads the FIMCE manager code into the
FIMCE memory. The FIMCE manager is the hypervisor’s delegate for housekeep-
ing purposes, e.g., setting up the software infrastructure. The hypervisor then loads
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the security task. Based on the parameters in the FIMCE starting hypercall, the
hypervisor may also load pillars. More details about the pillars and the FIMCE
manager are presented in Section 4.4.
At the end of the boot-up, the hypervisor prepares the security task’s execution.
If there are input parameters, it marshals them onto the FIMCE’s stack and sets
up the new secure stack pointer. Finally, the hypervisor passes the control to the
FIMCE manager which starts execution within the isolated environment.
4.2.2 Runtime
Once the FIMCE manager takes control, the FIMCE is in the running state. It
can only be interrupted by hardware events, software exceptions and non-maskable
interrupts. All software exceptions and critical hardware interrupts are considered as
system failure and trigger the hypervisor to terminate the FIMCE. Other interrupts
are handled by the empty handlers by default which simply return, unless their
corresponding handlers are installed during FIMCE launching (as part of a pillar).
4.2.3 Termination
A FIMCE can be shutdown due to the security task’s termination hypercall or due to
the system failure interrupts. To turn off a FIMCE, the hypervisor zeros its registers,
memory partition and invalidates the TLBs. It then switches the current VMCS to
the one used for the guest OS, re-enables the EPT on the current core. It undoes any
device assignment and returns them to the OS. Lastly it notifies the OS that the core
is returned.
4.2.4 Comparisons to Memory Isolation Primitive
Figure 4.2 depicts the architectural difference between the memory isolation primi-
tive used in existing schemes and the full isolation of FIMCE. The main distinction
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Figure 4.2: The comparison between the memory isolation primitive and FIMCE.
The gray regions denote resources controlled by the adversary and the dotted regions
denote isolated resources.
As compared with domain isolation [46] and memory isolation, FIMCE pos-
sesses their virtues without their drawbacks. It has the well-defined isolation bound-
ary between the trusted and the untrusted, as in domain isolation. Nonetheless, it
does not have a large Trusted Computing Base (TCB) as in Terra [46]. FIMCE also
achieves page-level granularity as in a memory isolation scheme, e.g., TrustVisor
[68]. It reuses the existing OS facility to load the security task, i.e. reading the
binary from disk and constructing the virtual address space. However, once the
security task is loaded, the guest OS is completely deprived of the capability to in-
terfere with its execution. In contrast, existing memory isolation schemes still allow
the guest OS to do so. For example, the guest OS can extract sensitive information
via page swapping, as demonstrated in [100]. Furthermore, on a multicore system,
the guest OS’s task scheduling makes it difficult for the hypervisor to track and en-
force access control policies as shown in Chapter 3. The design of FIMCE also
avoids the address space layout verification used in TrustVisor [68] and InkTag [51]
which is vulnerable to race condition attacks.
4.3 FIMCE and SGX
Although virtualization-based memory isolation systems suffer from the aforemen-
tioned security pitfalls, hardware-based techniques do not. Intel SGX provides a
hardware-based isolation environment for user-space programs. However, it re-
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mains as a challenging problem to use memory isolation techniques alone to protect
sensitive I/O tasks, e.g., reading a password from the keyboard. Existing systems
like Haven [20] rely on cryptographic techniques with a high performance toll. In
the following, SGX and FIMCE are compared from various aspects and then ex-
plore potential integration.
4.3.1 Comparisons
FIMCE and SGX are designed with different goals. SGX offers the memory iso-
lation service for applications to protect their sensitive data. Nonetheless, it still
requires the OS to manage platform resources, including the enclaves and the as-
sociated Enclave Page Cache (EPC) pages. FIMCE is geared to isolate a complete
computing environment and therefore covers all hardware and software resources
needed by the protected task. The wider coverage allows FIMCE to offer unique
advantages over SGX in several aspects.
Memory Isolation SGX and FIMCE provide different strengths of memory iso-
lation. SGX’s isolation is tightly integrated with hardware. The TCB only consists
of the underlying hardware which is the SGX-enabled CPU and the firmware. The
system software is considered as untrusted in SGX’s model. The EPC-related mem-
ory access check is performed after address translation and before physical memory
access [31]. When the processor is not in enclave mode, no system software, in-
cluding the System Management Mode (SMM) code, can access the content inside
an enclave. Data is also encrypted by the hardware when a cache line is evicted to
EPC pages. It is hence secure against bus snooping attacks. FIMCE isolation lever-
ages hardware-assisted virtualization techniques. Besides the underlying hardware
and firmware, the TCB of FIMCE also encloses the micro-hypervisor which has
several thousands SLOC. No encryption is applied when the isolated code writes
to the FIMCE memory. Therefore, FIMCE is strictly weaker than SGX in terms of
blocking illicit memory accesses.
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When the code inside the SGX enclave accesses non-EPC pages, SGX provides
no security assurance at all. The malicious OS may proactively present a faked
memory view to the enclave by using manipulated page tables. In contrast, the code
inside the FIMCE accesses all memory pages without obstruction from the OS as
the paging structures in use are entirely beyond the OS’s control. FIMCE offers
stronger security from this perspective.
Autonomous Execution SGX and FIMCE give different treatments of CPU
scheduling of the isolated program. SGX leaves thread scheduling inside the en-
clave to the OS. This design decision allows for the page fault attack [100] wherein
the guest OS interrupts the enclave execution and exfiltrates sensitive data.
FIMCE isolates a physical core and exposes a smaller attack surface to the OS.
The guest OS cannot influence the execution of the FIMCE thread. All exceptions,
including page fault, inside the FIMCE are handled internally. It is hence a highly
autonomous system with no runtime dependency on the OS.
I/O Capability SGX does not support I/O operations. Therefore, secure data
exchange between an enclave and the outside world becomes a challenging task.
As shown by Haven [20] and SCONE [16], a middle layer between the isolated ap-
plication and the OS is introduced to ensure data confidentiality and authenticity via
cryptographic means. This approach entails significant performance overhead, due
to the costly context switches to/from the enclave as well as the cryptographic op-
erations. According to SCONE [16], the I/O intensive benchmarks such as Apache
and Redis suffer 21% and 31% performance loss, respectively. Similar results are
also reported in Haven.
FIMCE provides inherent I/O support for the isolated tasks. I/O device isolation
guarantees exclusive accesses to peripheral devices. Although whitelisted device
drivers are still needed, the OS layer abstraction such as sockets or filesystems could
be simplified. Furthermore, since the device is isolated and accessed exclusively,
cryptographic protection is no longer needed. Note that context switch costs are
also saved as no context switch is required inside the FIMCE.
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Verifiable Launch SGX and FIMCE also differ in controlling the launch of
the isolated environment. Although SGX supports attestation, it does not enforce
policies for enclave launch. The permission to launch an enclave is decided by the
untrusted OS. In FIMCE’s design, the trusted hypervisor can verify the environment
to be launched against the security policies (if any). For instance, the platform
administrator may supply a signed whitelist to the hypervisor to specify permissible
tasks.
4.3.2 Integration with SGX
SGX and FIMCE are not mutually exclusive to each other. It is possible to integrate
both so that one’s strength complements the other’s weakness. In the following,


























Figure 4.3: FIMCE based isolated I/O for SGX enclaves
Share Memory Between Enclave and FIMCE A naive integration is to run
the SGX enclave and the FIMCE side-by-side (as in Figure 4.3(a)) with a shared
memory buffer used for intercommunication. Unfortunately, it is hard to secure
FIMCE-enclave data exchange in this fashion.
The shared buffer has to be on a non-EPC page. Otherwise, the task isolated
by the FIMCE cannot access it even with the hypervisor’s assistance. Since the
shared buffer is outside of the enclave, SGX provides no assurance on the security
of accessing them. Although the hypervisor is trusted under the FIMCE model,
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protecting the shared buffer using virtualization faces the same issues elaborated in
Chapter 3. Hence, it is not a promising approach to integrate SGX and FIMCE as
two separated environments in parallel.
Enclave Inside FIMCE Since loading a FIMCE within an enclave is infea-
sible, the next plausible approach is to launch an enclave inside a FIMCE (as in
Figure 4.3(b)). The security benefits of the combination are twofold. As compared
to SGX isolation alone, the adversary has no more control over the FIMCE/enclave
core. Hence, the composite isolation eliminates those SGX side-channel attacks
that require interleaved executions on the core. As compared to FIMCE isolation,
the composite isolation is not subject to bus snooping attacks by virtue of SGX
protection.
To support SGX enclaves inside the FIMCE, the hypervisor priorly reserves a
pool of EPC pages for FIMCE usage. This can be achieved by using normal EPT
mappings during boot up, as already implemented in KVM 1. Running with Ring
0 privilege, the FIMCE manager takes up the kernel’s responsibility to set up and
manage the enclave.
Specifically, the FIMCE environment is created and launched as described be-
fore, except that the protected task and pillars are loaded with Ring 3 privilege. To
create the enclave, the FIMCE manager executes SGX special instructions such as
EINIT. It then assigns EPC pages from the reserved pool to the enclave, and issues
EADD to add those needed FIMCE pages. After setting up the enclave, the manager
passes the control to the protected task which then issues EENTER to enter into the
enclave.
Multithreaded I/O A direct benefit of the design in Figure 4.3(b) is that the
code in the enclave can securely interact with I/O devices via the FIMCE environ-
ment. The design can be further extended to support multithreaded I/O operations
as depicted in Figure 4.3(c).
The idea is to leverage SGX multithread support. The main thread protected
1KVM patch note at https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg149534.html
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by SGX spawns one special thread dedicated for I/O operations. After the enclave
is created, the hypervisor migrates the I/O thread into the FIMCE following the
design in Figure 4.3(b). The FIMCE manager runs the EENTER instruction with
the supplied Thread Control Structure (TCS) that uniquely identifies the I/O thread.
Hence, the thread running on the FIMCE core and the main thread on the original
SGX core belong to the same enclave. The threads intercommunicate through a
shared buffer on the allocated EPC pages. The hardware ensures that only those
threads belong to the same enclave can access the buffer.
When the main thread needs to access the device, it places a request in the
shared buffer. The request is served by the I/O thread inside the FIMCEwhereby the
FIMCE’s device pillars which then perform the desired I/O operations. Similarly,
incoming I/O data can be securely forwarded back to the main thread.
The OS may create a fake FIMCE environment when the I/O thread’s enclave is
created. To detect the attack, the main thread inside the enclave can request the I/O
thread to perform an attestation about the underlying environment. Note that after
the I/O thread is migrated into the FIMCE, it is no longer under the OS scheduling.
4.4 Modularized Software Infrastructure
It is widely recognized that existing schemes require the protected task to be self-
contained, such as in TrustVisor [68] . In contrast, FIMCE has the inborn support
for dynamically setting up the software infrastructure e.g., libraries, drivers and
interrupt handlers, to cater to the task’s needs. It’s better to use a structured way to
construct the FIMCE software infrastructure. Based on their functionalities, a set
of software modules called pillars are stored in the disk in the form of Executable
and Linkable Format (ELF) files. A pillar is a self-contained shared library for a
particular purpose. For instance, a TPM pillar consists of all functions needed to
operate the TPM chip. Based on the protected task’s demand, the guest OS loads
the needed pillar files from the disk to the memory. Then, the hypervisor relocates
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them into the FIMCE after integrity checking. The main challenges here are how
to ensure the integrity of pillar and how to check correctness of linking without
significantly increasing the hypervisor’s code size.
4.4.1 Pillars
Pillars provide services that are otherwise not easily available to the security task
due to the absence of OS in the FIMCE. Each pillar is assigned with a globally
unique 32-bit pillar identifier (PLID). Each function that a pillar exports is assigned
with a locally unique 32-bit interface identifier (IID). Therefore, a (PLID, IID) pair
uniquely identify a function in the whole system.
Pillars resemble legacy shared libraries to a large extent. They are compiled as
position-independent code because the actual position of a pillar in memory is not
determined until it is loaded. They reside in disks as files in the ELF format (for
Linux). A pillar differs from a shared library in two aspects. Firstly, a pillar must be
self-contained. The code of a pillar function does not depend on any code outside
of the pillar. Secondly, the ELF format of a pillar has a new section called pillar
descriptor (.p desc) which contains the pillar’s PLID, the description of exposed
interfaces, and a signature from a Trusted Third Party (TTP).
Pillar Signing The signature included in a pillars’ binary image can be provided
by a third party who provides the signing service. The service provider computes
the signature for binaries submitted to it for signing and embed the signature in the
aforementioned section in the returned binaries. The service provider also makes
available any public keys that are needed to verify the signatures. The system ad-
ministrators configure the system so that the keys are loaded into the hypervisor,
which can be done by directly embedding the key into the binary image of the hy-
pervisor. This way allows the boot time integrity of the keys to be verified by TPM
as part of the hypervisor image. Therefore, at runtime the hypervisor can verify the
signatures in the pillars.
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Pillar Loading To reduce the hypervisor’s workload, the application hosting the
security task requests the guest kernel to load the needed pillars into the guest mem-
ory as regular shared libraries. When the application issues a hypercall to request
FIMCE protection for its security task, the parameters passed to the hypervisor in-
clude the needed pillars’ PLIDs and their memory layouts. Given the PLID, the
hypervisor locates the corresponding pillar in the guest memory, copies it into the
FIMCE memory and maps the pillar pages at the same virtual addresses as in the
guest. By relying on the guest to manage the pillars in the memory, the hypervisor
does not need to support filesystems or disk operations.
4.4.2 Pillar Verification and Linking
Once the needed pillars and the security task are loaded into the FIMCE, the hy-
pervisor passes the control of the core to the FIMCE manager code. If the manager
code verifies pillar integrity successfully, it links the security task to the pillars and
passes the control to the entry point of the security task.
Pillar verification
Integrity verification is not as straightforward as it seems because it is infeasible
to verify the pillar as one whole chunk. The shared library loading procedure may
zero some sections and the kernel also performs dynamic linking and running of the
library initialization code as well. These operations result in discrepancies between
the pillar’s memory image and its file in the disk.
Nonetheless, shared libraries are compiled into position independent code that is
expected to remain unaltered throughout the loading process. Therefore, the authen-
tication tag of a pillar is a TTP signature protecting the following invariant sections:
code sections, data sections, library initialization sections, finish sections, the pillar
descriptor section and the section header table of the pillar ELF file. If the verifi-
cation fails, the manager issues a hypercall to terminate the FIMCE and an error is
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returned to the application.
Global symbol references within a pillar are also subject to attacks by the guest
kernel. Such references are completed with the assistance of the Procedure Linkage
Table (PLT) and the Global Offset Table (GOT) inside the module itself. The entries
are typically filled by the loader in the guest. In order to thwart possible attacks, the
dynamic symbol table, relocation entries and the string table of the pillar are also
signed by the TTP. During loading, the dynamic loader are explicitly requested to
resolve all symbols, so that all GOT entries are filled. After the pillar is loaded
into the FIMCE, these values are then verified by the FIMCE manager against the
corresponding relocation entry to ensure that they refer to the correct locations.
Dynamic Linking
Although the kernel has the capability of linking pillars with the security task,
FIMCE can hardly benefit from the kernel’s assistance because of potential attacks.
A function call to another object file is normally compiled to a call to an entry in the
PLT in the originating object file. Because the hypervisor lacks sufficient semantics
to determine which entries in the PLT are genuine ones used by the security task, it
is costly for the hypervisor to bridge the gap.
FIMCE devise a novel lightweight scheme to link the security task with pillar
functions at runtime within the FIMCE. The idea is to introduce a resolver function
and a jump table as part of the FIMCEmanager. Both are placed at fixed locations in
the FIMCE address space by the hypervisor during FIMCE setup. After verifying
all pillars loaded in the FIMCE, the manager parses their descriptor sections and
fills the jump table with entries corresponding to each available interface. A jump
table is in essence a sorted array of (PLID, IID, entry-address).
A function call from the security task to a pillar function is replaced by a call
via a function pointer which takes the original input parameters as well as a pair of
(PLID,IID) with a parameter counter. At runtime, the function pointer is assigned
with the resolver function’s address. After being called, the resolver rearranges the
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stack according to the parameter counter, looks up the jump table to find the entry
address of the callee function, restores the stack frame used before the call and
uses an unconditional jump to redirect execution to the entry. The callee function
executes as if it were called directly by the security task, and returns to the security
task after execution.
4.5 Applications of FIMCE
Besides isolation, FIMCE can be applied to other types of applications. In the
following, two new types of applications are presented. The first application taps
into FIMCE malleability to protect a program’s long term secret. The second one
establishes a runtime trust anchor by exploring the parallelism between a FIMCE
and the guest kernel.
4.5.1 Malleability
The FIMCE environment can be configured in a non-standard fashion because its
hardware setting is prepared by the hypervisor for the isolated task’s exclusively
use. For instance, the hypervisor can twist the CPU registers and even the TPM
configuration.
To demonstrate the benefit of malleability, let us consider the challenge of en-
suring that an application P ’s long term secret k can only be accessed in its isolated
environment. Suppose that k has been initially encrypted with the binding to the
isolated environment. The difficulty lies in how to authenticate the thread that re-
quests to enter into the isolated environment. Note TPM’s sealed storage alone
cannot directly solve this problem. Sealed storage is a mechanism to bind a secret
to a set of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) on the TPM chip. Since most
PCRs can be extended by software, the PCR values are dependent on the software
that extends them. Therefore, without a proper access control on the PCRs, PCR
values do not truly reflect the environment states. Under the adversary model, the
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default locality-based access control is not adequate.
Since the application cannot hide any secret in the unprotected memory against
the OS, both have the equal knowledge and capability in terms of presenting the au-
thentication information to the hardware. One may suggest leveraging the hypervi-
sor to perform authentication as shown in [68]. However, as analyzed in Chapter 3,
it is challenging for the hypervisor to securely authenticate the application without
sufficient knowledge about the kernel level semantics.
With a malleable environment, FIMCE offers an elegant solution. The hyper-
visor uses the TPM Locality 2 and assigns the OS with Locality 0 and the code
inside a FIMCE with Locality 1. During boot up, the DRTM extends PCR17 and
PCR18 with the hypervisor and other loaded modules. When a FIMCE is launched,
the hypervisor resets PCR20 and extends PCR20 with all code and data loaded in
the FIMCE. The protected code in turn extends it with all relevant data, and seals
the secret k with PCR17, PCR18 and PCR20. Once the seal operation is done,
it extends PCR20 with an arbitrary binary string to obliterate PCR20 content and
relinquishes its Locality-1 access so that the OS is free to use the TPM. The same
steps are performed in order to unseal k.
Note that PCR17 and PCR18 are in Locality 4 and 3 respectively. The hardware
ensures that they cannot be reset by any software. During the boot up, the DRTM
extends these two registers with the loaded modules. Their correct content implies
the loading time integrity of the hypervisor. Since the OS is in Locality 0, it does
not have the privilege to extend or reset PCR20, even though it can prepare the same
input used by the hypervisor and application P . Other (malicious) applications in
their own FIMCEs cannot impersonate P either. PCR20 stores the birthmark of
a FIMCE instance because the code in a FIMCE cannot reset PCR20. Therefore,
other applications cannot remove their own birthmarks to produce the same digest
as P does.
The advantage of the method is that the hypervisor does not hold any secret and
is oblivious to the application’s logic and semantics. Besides the stronger security
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bolstered by the hardware, it has a small TCB and supports process migration.
4.5.2 Runtime Trust Anchor
Another noticeable strength of FIMCE is its ability to provide an isolated environ-
ment that securely runs in parallel with the untrusted OS yet without suffering from
the semantic gap. The environment can host a trust anchor to tackle runtime security
issues such as monitoring and policy enforcement. To show the benefit of a runtime
trust anchor, two systems are sketched below.
The first system is to prevent sensitive disk files from being modified or
deleted by the untrusted OS. This problem has been studied by Lockdown [94] and
Guardian [27]. Lockdown suffers from performance loss as every disk I/O operation
entails a VM exit (if not optimized) while the approach used in Guardian cannot be
applied for arbitrary files chosen by applications. In the FIMCE approach, a FIMCE
is used as the disk I/O checkpoint. The hypervisor isolates the disk to the FIMCE.
A disk I/O filter is loaded in the FIMCE. It continuously reads from a share buffer
the disk-related Direct Memory Access (DMA) requests placed by the OS. If the
request is compliant with the security policy, the filter forwards it to the disk con-
troller. Otherwise, it drops the request. All disk interrupts are channeled to the OS
so that the filter is not necessarily involved in handling them. In this design, the
filter is isolated from the guest and the DMA requests are always checked without
the cost for VM exit and entry.
The second system is about the runtime attestation of the OS behavior. Most
existing remote attestation schemes [79, 54, 68] focus on loading time integrity
check. It is challenging to realize runtime attestation because it requires the attes-
tation agent to run securely inside the attesting platform managed by an untrusted
OS. With FIMCE protection, the agent runs like an isolated kernel thread side-by-
side with the OS. The attestation agent can read the kernel objects without facing
the challenging semantic gap problem [87, 40, 52, 43]. To support kernel memory
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read, the entire kernel page table is copied into the FIMCE. The hypervisor properly
configures the EPTs such that only the agent code pages are executable in order to
prevent untrusted kernel code from executing inside the FIMCE.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to solve the attestation problem using the existing
memory isolation primitive. If the untrusted guest OS still manages the CPU cores,
it can schedule off the attestation agent from the CPU before its attacks and resumes
it afterwards. Hence, the attestation does not reflect the genuine state of the kernel.
4.6 Evaluations
4.6.1 Security Analysis
It remains as an open problem to formally prove the security of a system design
(not implementation). Therefore, the security analysis below is informal. First, the
multicore complications plaguing memory isolation systems are not applicable to
the FIMCE design. Then, FIMCE’s security is evaluated based on its attack surface
and TCB size.
Complication Free Recall that Chapter 3 has enumerated a number of security
complications on the multicore platforms. Since the FIMCE is a fully isolated en-
vironment, its design does not face these complications. The semantics from the
untrusted kernel is controlled and does not affect the enforcement of the isolation
policy.
• The EPT management of FIMCE is rather simple. The EPTs used for the
OS (and the applications) are not affected by FIMCE. Since the trusted and
untrusted execution flows do not interleave with each other on any CPU core,
the hypervisor does not need to trace the executions in order to switch EPTs.
In addition, the attacks in Section 3.4.3 that exploit stale TLB entries are
infeasible. The physical memory of the FIMCE is never accessed by threads
outside of the environment. Moreover, when a FIMCE is terminated, the TLB
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entries in the core are all flushed out. Hence, there is no stale TLB entry in
the system.
• FIMCE does not suffer from the issue of guest page table checking. The
execution inside the FIMCE has no dependence on data controlled by the
guest OS including the page tables, which makes Iago-like attacks impossible.
It is also clear that the full isolation is not subject to the race condition attack
described in Section 3.4.
• Existing schemes need to bind subjects and objects to certain states to choose
the proper EPT setting. This challenging problem does not exist in the FIMCE
scheme. The isolated task is bound to the FIMCE created for it through
its whole lifetime. It exclusively accesses the memory. The task may con-
tinue the execution without being preempted by other threads under the OS’s
control. In case that it relinquishes the CPU, its FIMCE hibernates without
changing ownership. In other words, all memory states and the CPU context
are saved. The CPU states are cleaned up before the OS takes control. When
needed, the FIMCE is re-activated from the saved state. Therefore, subject
identification is not needed.
• The issue of translating events do not exist in FIMCE. Because the opera-
tion of FIMCE is independent from the guest OS. The only events that the
hypervisor needs to intervene are the hypercalls from the protected applica-
tion. These events are well-defined. During the operation of the FIMCE, the
hypervisor also does not intervene.
• The enforcement granularity issue does not exist in FIMCE. Although FIMCE
still relies on page tables, the memory pages used by a FIMCE are not shared
with the kernel. Therefore, there is no page that contains data that needs to be
accessed by different privileges.
Reduced Attack Surface The malicious kernel in memory isolation systems
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enjoys a large attack surface, as it has the full control over the CPU cores and the
VA-to-GPA mapping, which leads to various attacks and design complications de-
scribed in Chapter 3. In contrast, the attack surface exposed by FIMCE is reduced.
Owing to the full isolation approach, the FIMCE’s hardware and software are
beyond the kernel’s access, interference and manipulation. The kernel cannot access
the FIMCE core’s registers, L1 and L2 caches. L3 cache is not effectively accessible
either because the FIMCE’s host physical address region is never mapped to the
guest. Although the kernel may use IPI or NMI to interrupt the FIMCE, the worst
consequence is equivalent to a DoS attack. Since the isolated code handles the
interrupts by itself, an IPI or NMI only results in a detour of the control flow. Note
that there is no context switch inside the FIMCE.
Another attack vector widely considered in the literature is the interaction be-
tween the hypervisor and the kernel. The FIMCE hypervisor only exports two hy-
percalls, for setting up and terminating the FIMCE respectively. Moreover, the hy-
pervisor does not interpose on either the guest execution or the FIMCE execution.
The FIMCE may exchange data with threads in the outside environment. In
that case, the malicious kernel may poison the input data to the isolated task. It is
acknowledged that the protected code is subject to such attacks if no proper input
checking is in place. However, it is out of scope of the FIMCE work to sanitize the
inputs.
Strength of Full Isolation The FIMCE isolation is enforced by the hardware.
The memory used by the FIMCE is from a reserved physical memory region which
is never mapped to the guest by the EPT and the IOMMU page table. Both segmen-
tation and paging of the FIMCE memory are constructed by the hypervisor. It is
thus obvious that the attacks in Section 3.4.3 do not work against the FIMCE. The
guest kernel cannot make modifications to either segmentation- or paging-related
data structures to tamper with the address space.
Security of Foreign Code in FIMCE In addition to the security task, the
FIMCE hosts the needed pillars and the FIMCE manager. It is crucial to ensure
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the integrity of their code and the linking process. The FIMCE manager’s code is
copied from the hypervisor space. Therefore, its integrity is ensured as long as the
hypervisor is trusted.
During FIMCE launching, the integrity of the loaded pillars’ code images (in-
cluding the relocation sections) are verified by the FIMCE manager in order to
prevent the kernel from poisoning them. To ensure linking integrity, the jump ta-
ble is constructed using the verified pillar description sections. Addresses in the
GOT entries used for symbol references within a pillar are also checked by the
FIMCE manager to match the corresponding addresses computed from the pillar’s
relocation-related sections.
Small TCB Size The hypervisor is the only trusted code in the system. With a
simple logic, the FIMCE hypervisor has a tiny code base with around six thousand
lines of source code for runtime execution. It is easy to manage concurrency in
the hypervisor space. Because only the setup and teardown code possibly execute
concurrently on different cores, they can be synchronized with simple spinlocks.
Note that each FIMCE instance does not have overlapping regions, which also help
simplify concurrency handling.
4.6.2 Implementation
A prototype of FIMCE has been implemented on a desktop computer with an Intel
Core i7 2600 quad-core processor running at 3.4 GHz, Q67 chipset, 4GB of DDR3
RAM and a TPM chip. The platform runs an Ubuntu 12.04 guest with the stock
kernel version 3.2.0-84-generic. The FIMCE hypervisor consists of around 6000
source line of code (SLOC). It exports two hypercalls, i.e., FIMCE start() and
FIMCE term(), for starting and terminating a FIMCE, respectively. The TCB of
FIMCE only consists of the TXT bootloader, the hypervisor and any hardware and
firmware required by DRTM. Intel’s open source TXT bootloader tboot2 is slightly
2http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot/
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modified to load the FIMCE hypervisor. The modification is to make the bootloader
jump to the FIMCE hypervisor’s entry at the end of the boot up sequence. During
hypervisor initialization, a set of EPT entries are initialized such that a chunk of
physical memory is reserved for exclusive use by the hypervisor. During the OS
kernel initialization, all cores are set to use the same set of EPTs, ensuring a uniform
view of the memory.
To showcase the applications of FIMCE, three pillars are also developed: a 7KB
serial port driver pillar that supports keyboard I/O, a comprehensive crypto pillar of
451KB size based on the mbed TLS library 3, a TPM driver pillar of 20KB size.
The implementation also encloses a FIMCE management code of 413 SLOC which
verifies and links pillars in use.
Programming Interface As shown in Table 4.1, the user space FIMCE library
provides two interfaces and three macros. The two interface functions are used
to start and stop the FIMCE, respectively. They are in essence wrappers of the
hypercalls to pass parameters to the hypervisor. The first two macros are for the
application developer to specify the function to be protected, as well as the ELF file
names of pillars to be loaded. The third macro converts a normal C function call
into a pillar function call. (Note that the dynamic linking mechanism in a FIMCE is
different from in the OS.)
Table 4.1: User Space Library Interfaces and Macros
Interface Description
start FIMCE () Call to start FIMCE
stop FIMCE () Call to stop FIMCE
Macros
FIMCE SECURITY TASK () Specify function that is the security task
FIMCE LOAD PILLAR () Specify the file name of the pillar
CALL PIL () Call a pillar function in a security task
Internals of start FIMCE() This user space function runs in two steps in the
guest domain. Firstly, it helps to load all data and code needed by the hypervisor
into the main memory. It finds the address of FIMCE PAYLOAD from the symbol
table and the locations of needed pillars, including the base addresses and lengths
3https://tls.mbed.org/
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of all segments with assistance of the dynamic loader. To ensure that the contents
are indeed loaded into memory, it reads all pages of the pillars.
The second step is to gracefully take one CPU core offline from the guest so that
the (honest) kernel does not attempt to use the core dedicated for the FIMCE. For
this purpose, the function reads the file /proc/cpuinfo and gets the physical
APIC ID of a randomly chosen CPU core. It then writes a ‘0’ to the corresponding
control file named as online. In the end, it issues a hypercall to pass to the hypervisor
the physical APIC ID, all offsets and lengths of the security task and its pillars.
The issuance of the hypercall traps the present core running start FIMCE to
the hypervisor, not the offline core chosen for the FIMCE. Therefore, the hypervisor
initializes necessary data structures for the FIMCE and needs to take control of the
FIMCE core. To achieve this, it sends an INIT signal to the offline core identified
by the physical APIC ID and returns from the hypercall so that the present core is
returned to the guest OS. The INIT signal is intercepted by the hypervisor on the
FIMCE core. The hypervisor then loads the prepared VMCS and performs a VM
entry to start the FIMCE.
4.6.3 Benchmarks
Since a FIMCE occupies a CPU core exclusively, the OS has less computation
power at its disposal while the FIMCE is running. In order to understand the over-
all impact of a running FIMCE on the platform, a suite of benchmarks including
multithreaded SPECint rate 2006 and kernel-build as well as single threaded lm-
bench, postmark and netperf are run. They are first run on top of the OS without
any FIMCE running and then repeated with an infinite loop as the security task in
the FIMCE.
For the multithreaded SPECint rate 2006, the concurrency level is set to four.
Figure 4.4 shows that it has 15% percent performance drop on average due to the
presence of FIMCE. In the kernel-build experiment, the Linux kernel v2.6 is com-
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piled using the default configuration with four-level concurrency. The results are
reported in Table 4.2. The two sets of experiments indicate that the relative per-
formance loss grows with the degree of concurrency, mainly due to more frequent
context switches. Nonetheless, the loss is bounded by the inverse of the number of
physical cores in the platform (namely 25% in the setting).
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Figure 4.4: SPECint rate 2006 results.
The numbers are the percentage of the
score with FIMCE to the score without
FIMCE.
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Figure 4.5: Lmbench results. The num-
bers are the percentage of the score with
FIMCE to the score without FIMCE.
To verify the estimation that FIMCE does not incur much performance cost
for single-threaded applications, Lmbench, Netperf and Postmark are run with and
without FIMCE. Figure 4.5 shows that most tasks of Lmbench are not affected by
FIMCE, except that one task has 8% performance drop. Similar results are also
found for Netperf as in Table 4.3 and Postmark as in Table 4.4.
4.6.4 Component Costs
The major overhead of FIMCE is in its launching phase. The security task’s exe-
cution inside the FIMCE does not involve the hypervisor and thus incurs no cost
as compared to its normal execution. The launching cost consists of three parts: a
hypercall (a VM exit and a VM entry), FIMCE setup including resource allocation
and environment setup, and code loading.
Table 4.2: Kernel Build Time (in
seconds)
Concurrency level 4 6 8 12
W/O FIMCE 783 708 640 643
With FIMCE 900 828 797 803
Performance Loss (%) 15 17 24 24
Table 4.3: Netperf Bandwidth With And
Without FIMCE Running (in Mbps)
TCP Stream UDP Stream
W/O FIMCE 93.92 95.99
With FIMCE 93.95 95.95
Performance Loss (%) 0.03 0
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Table 4.4: Single-threaded Post-
mark Performance with and without
FIMCE Running (in seconds)
W/O FIMCE 327
With FIMCE 330
Performance Loss (%) 1
Table 4.5: Loading Time for Pillars
with Various Sizes
Size (KB) 7 11 15 19 23 27 31 35
Time (µs) 56 58 61 63 63 65 66 68
On average, a null hypercall on the experiment platform takes 0.31 millisec-
ond. FIMCE setup takes about 47.33milliseconds which is the interval between the
FIMCE start hypercall to the INIT signal prior to the start of FIMCE execution.
The code loading time depends on the total binary size of the loaded pillars and the
security task. Table 4.5 shows the time needed to copy a chunk of bytes from the
guest to the FIMCE, including preparing the mapping and memory read/write. On
the experiment platform, every 4KB memory read and write cost about 2µs.
Pillar loading also involves integrity verification. The measurement shows that
it takes about 40.3 microseconds to verify one RSA signature inside the FIMCE.
Therefore, the total cost of launching the FIMCE (mostly depending on the number
of public key signatures to verify) is in the range of 100 milliseconds to a few
seconds. There are several ways to save this one-time cost. For instance, a pillar’s
integrity can be protected by using HMAC whose verification is several orders of
magnitude faster than signature verification. Another is for the hypervisor to cache
some frequently used pillars which are used without integrity check during FIMCE
launching.
4.6.5 Application Evaluation
Four use cases are implemented to demonstrate the power of FIMCE. The use cases
include password based decryption, an Apache server performing online RSA de-
cryption, long term secret protection and runtime kernel state attestation.
Password based decryption It is challenging to protect tasks with I/O opera-
tions using memory isolation, mainly because I/O operations are normally in the
kernel which has a large and dispersed code base and are interactive with devices.
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Driverguard [28] relies on manual driver code instrumentation, which is tedious and
error-prone. TrustPath [104] relocates the entire driver into the isolated user space,
which not only requires significant changes in the user space code, but also burdens
the hypervisor with complex functions. As a result, there are a lot of hypercalls
when issuing I/O commands and handling interrupts, which incurs a heavy perfor-
mance loss because of frequent expensive VM exits.
FIMCE offers a more efficient solution. The code running inside the FIMCE is
in Ring 0 and is capable of handling interrupts. Furthermore, with hardware virtu-
alization, the hypervisor can channel the peripheral device interrupts to the FIMCE
core for the isolated task to process. Therefore, a device’s I/O can be conveniently
supported as long as its driver pillar is loaded into the FIMCE.
A program is implemented that reads the user’s password inputs from the key-
board, converts it to the decryption key and then performs an AES decryption. When
the FIMCE is launched to protect this program, the hypervisor isolates the keyboard
by intercepting the guest’s port I/O accesses. A serial port pillar and the crypto pil-
lar are loaded into the FIMCE. The program is run with FIMCE protection for 100
times. In average, it takes 0.94 milliseconds to decrypt the ciphertext of 1kilobytes,
which is only 5.2% slower than in the guest.
Apache Server In this case study, FIMCE is utilized to harden an SSL web
server by isolating its RSA decryption of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) handshakes.
As noted previously, existing systems [68, 26] on Apache protection is not secure
under the multicore setting. Moreover, since the isolated code runs in the same
thread as its caller, it incurs frequent VM exits and VM entries as the control flow
enters and leaves the isolated environment. FIMCE does not incur context switches
at runtime because the isolated task in a FIMCE runs as a separated thread in parallel
with others.
In the experiment, the Apache source code is customized such that its SSL hand-
shake decryption function is protected by a FIMCE. Apache runs in prefork mode
with eight worker processes. Each worker process forwards incoming requests to
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the decryption function inside the FIMCE and subsequently fetches the decrypted
master secrets.
The server is connected to a LAN and ApacheBench is run with different con-
currency levels. The Apache server hosts an HTML page of 500KB. This setting is
compared with the same experiment without using FIMCE protection whereby all
worker processes are able to perform the decryption concurrently. The results are
shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Modified Apache Performance, # of SSL Handshakes per Second
Concurrency Level 1 2 4 32 128 256
W/O FIMCE 7.39 13.96 20.21 26.95 27.88 29.69
With FIMCE 7.31 14.04 20.09 20.21 21.09 22.23
Overhead (%) 1 0 0.5 25.0 24.4 25
It is evident that at low concurrency level of up to four, the FIMCE-enabled
Apache server performs almost equally well as the native multithreaded Apache. It
outperforms existing schemes listed in Table 4.7 due to the fact that FIMCE does
not involve costly context switches. However, its performance drops as the concur-
rency level increases, but is bounded by 25%. This is because the single-threaded
FIMCE cannot match the performance of a multithreaded Apache which can use all
four cores to perform concurrent decryption. The performances of TrustVisor [68],
InkTag [51] and Overshadow [26] are not affected by concurrency, albeit they are
not secure in a multicore system.
Table 4.7: Overhead Of Other Protection Schemes (numbers are excerpted from
respective paper)
Schemes Overhead
TrustVisor [68] 9.7% to 11.9% depending on concurrent transaction
InkTag [51] 2% in throughput, 100 concurrent request
Overshadow [26] 20% to 50% on a 1Gbps link, 50 concurrent request
However, the design of FIMCE can certainly be extended to support concurrent
FIMCE instances, at the expense of more cores dedicated for security. Also, in real
world web transactions, the time spent for RSA decryption accounts for a much
smaller portion of the entire transactions as compared to in the benchmark testing,
because of (1) longer network delays in the Internet; (2) more SSL sessions using
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the same master key decrypted from one SSL handshake; (3) more time needed to
generate or locate the need web pages. Therefore, the performance loss of using
FIMCE for a real web server does not appear as discouraging as in the experiments.
Long Term Secret Protection The malleability of FIMCE architecture is
demonstrated via the long term secret protection application. A program is im-
plemented to bind a long term secret to the FIMCE instance. The program and the
TPM pillar are loaded into the FIMCE. During FIMCE launching, the hypervisor
extends PCR 20 which bear the birthmark of this FIMCE instance. The program
seals and unseals a long term secret to PCR17, PCR18 and PCR20. the time taken
by the TPM seal and unseal operations inside the FIMCE is measured and compared
with the baseline experiment wherein the TPM pillar runs as a kernel module. The
results of protecting a 20-byte long secret are shown Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: TPM Performance (in seconds)
TPM Seal TPM Unseal
Guest 0.54 0.96
FIMCE 0.41 0.94
FIMCE shows slight speed up compared to the performance inside the guest.
One of the contributing factors is that there is more kernel code involved when
running the TPM operations inside the guest. CPU scheduling is another possible
factor affecting the performance because the entire operation is rather lengthy. In
contrast, due to the simple structure, FIMCE does not have such overhead.
Compared with existing approaches that virtualize the TPM using software such
as [68], the FIMCE approach places the trust directly on the hardware TPM chip. In
contrast, virtualizing TPM requires the code that virtualizes the TPM to be included
in the trust chain. The architecture of FIMCE allows us to multiplex accesses to the
TPM chip with a smaller attack surface and the smaller TCB.
Runtime Kernel Introspection with Attestation A program for kernel intro-
spection is implemented in this case. Running as a kernel thread isolated in the
FIMCE, the program reads the mm struct member of the init task structure
used by the guest kernel. It takes about 3.04 µs to read a kernel object which is
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comparable with the time (around 3.11 µs) needed by the kernel itself. This in-
trospection system is more efficient than existing schemes like [43] because it runs
natively on the hardware in the same fashion as running inside the kernel. According
to the experiment, the speed of native instruction execution with MMU translating a
virtual address is about 300 times faster than using software to walk the page table.
This prototype is further extended to be the ImEE system in Chapter 5.
The introspection results can be attested by the FIMCE system to a remote ver-
ifier. As there is a chain of trust established during FIMCE launching, it is conve-
nient to use the code inside the FIMCE to do runtime attestation. The root of the
trust chain is Intel’s TXT facility. When the hypervisor is loaded, the hardware mea-
sures its integrity before launching. The hypervisor then measures all code during
FIMCE launching. At runtime, the code inside the FIMCE measures the kernel’s
states. The measurements are stored in various PCRs depending on the assigned lo-
calities. Note that one of the challenges of existing TPM-based attestation schemes
is to have a reliable attestation agent which (ideally) is immune from attacks of
the attested objects, and at the same time, nimble enough to dynamically perform
measurements whenever needed. FIMCE exactly offers such a solution.
In this implementation, the introspection code inside the FIMCE uses the crypto
pillar to sign the introspection results with a TPM quote for PCR 17, 18 and 20
which vouches for the FIMCE environment. The entire process runs in parallel
with the guest OS. It takes 3.47 seconds in average to perform the entire procedure,
including the time for TPM quote operation.
4.7 Discussion and Future Directions
With the core number steadily increasing, the seemingly significant 25imposed by
the FIMCE architecture is likely to wane. For example, some of the latest generation
desktop CPU at the time of writing has already been equipped with eight cores,
thereby reducing the performance drop to be bounded by 12.5to continue to grow
91
in the future, which makes the FIMCE architecture increasingly relevant.
To minimize the performance impact, the FIMCE environment can safely sleep
when not needed. The isolation on the physical core can be temporarily torn down
while the one on the memory and devices is still in effect. The core is then returned
to the guest OS for its own purpose. This kind of temporary switch of the identity
binding between the hardware thread and the high-level entities does not undermine
security because the isolation policy about the resources, i.e. time slices, memory
and devices, is clearcut due to the full isolation approach.
Since the switching between a non-FIMCE environment and FIMCE on a phys-
ical core still imposes some overhead, it remains open to evaluate such overhead
and design a secure and efficient on-demand activation scheme of the FIMCE en-
vironment. It is likely that such a scheme would employ certain batch processing
technique to amortize the cost over a number of service requests, while minimiz-
ing the observed delay by the applications that request for the service. The scheme
should also take into account the fact that in the on-demand design, the scheduling
policy is left to the untrusted guest kernel to enforce, therefore, it may simply deny
FIMCE’s execution by permanently holding on to the cores.
Lastly, it remains open to evaluate the applicability of FIMCE on other archi-
tectures such as ARM platforms equipped with virtualization features. ARM pro-
cessors are also equipped with more and more cores, which makes them a suitable





The Immersive Execution Environment (ImEE) is presented in this chapter. The
ImEE builds on top of the fully isolated environment, while incorporating special
configurations for a consistent memory view with the target VM. ImEE directly
reuses the kernel semantics in the kernel page tables for consistent introspection of
any high-level objects. In this chapter, firstly, the inadequacy of existing software-
based approach is discussed to motivate the design. Next, the details of ImEE are
present in the following sections.
5.1 The Inference Gap in Software-based Guest Ac-
cess
It is a common practice in the VMI literature to use software to emulate virtual
address translation before accessing a target guest VM. This approach to bridge the
inference gap results in an inconsistent memory between the introspection tool and
the guest VM.
In the software-based approach, the target memory is mapped to the monitor
VM as a set of read-only pages. In the most general case, given a virtual addressX ,
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the introspection code walks through all levels of the paging structures, including
the EPTs in the memory to find out the corresponding HPA. It then maps the HPA
to its own virtual address space before finally reads it. Obviously, such a procedure
incurs a much longer latency than the native access to X in the guest.
To assess how slow the software-based guest access is relative to the native
access, a “cat-and-mouse” experiment is run. The introspection program based-
on LibVMI [72], a cross-platform VMI framework, keeps reading a guest process’s
task->cred pointer, while a guest kernel thread periodically modifies the pointer
and waits for 20,000 CPU cycles before restoring its value. The page-level data
cache of LibVMI is disabled to ensure the freshness of every read whereas the
translation caches are on since no address mapping is modified. The experiment
was run for eight times, each lasting 10 seconds. In average, the modification was
only spotted after being repeated 60 rounds. In one of the eight times, no modi-
fication was caught. The experiment result demonstrates that introspection at low
speed cannot catch up with the fast-running attacker. It is ill-suited for scenarios
demanding quick responses such as live forensics and real-time I/O monitoring.
The slow speed also affects the mapping consistency as the guest malware in the
kernel may make transient changes to the page tables, rather than the data. Since
walking the paging structures appears instant to the malware using the MMU, but
not to the introspection software, the malware’s attack on the page tables causes the
VMI tool to use inconsistent information obtained from the paging structures.
Caching techniques have been used in order to reduce the latency of guest ac-
cesses. For instance, LibVMI introduces three types of caches: the page-level data
cache, the VA-to-HPA translation cache and the pid to CR3 cache. While pro-
moting the performance, using the caches is detrimental to effective introspection.
Since the guest continuously runs during the introspection, any cached mapping or
data is not guaranteed to be consistent with the one in the memory. Moreover, it
is difficult for the software-based approach with caches to catch up with the pace
of CR3 updates in the guest. Since the guest kernel is untrusted, the introspection
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cannot presume that all guest threads share the same kernel address space. CR3
synchronization with the guest may lead to cache thrashing which backfires on the
introspection performance.
Besides the security related limitations described above, the software method
has performance-related drawbacks. It usually has a bulky code base since it has
to fully emulate the MMU’s behavior, such as supporting 32-bit and 64-bit paging
structures as well as different modes and page sizes. Its operation leaves a large
memory footprint because of the intensive reliance on data and translation caches.
It also suffers from slow-start due to the complex setup. For instance, the LibVMI
initialization costs 100 milliseconds according to the measurement. To change the
introspection target from one VM to another requires a new setup. With these per-
formance pitfalls, the software-based method is not the best choice for introspection




The basic idea behind the special computing environment called Immersive Exe-
cution Environment (ImEE) is to construct a twisted address mapping setting (as
in Figure 5.1). The ImEE’s CR3 is synchronized with the target VM’s active CR3
so that its MMU directly uses the target’s VA-to-GPA mappings. Its GPA-to-HPA
mappings are split into two. The GPAs for the intended introspection are translated
with the same mappings as in the target VM; the GPAs for the local usage (indicated
by the dotted box in Figure 5.1) are mapped to the local physical pages via sepa-
rated GPA-to-HPA mappings. With this setting, memory accesses are automatically
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the idea of direct usage of the target VM’s VA-to-GPA
mappings and splitting in GPA-to-HPA mappings. Note that the shadow box is fully
controlled by the target (i.e., the adversary).
The paging structure setup in the ImEE ensures mapping consistency with the
target VM. Firstly, the ImEE’s VA-to-GPA mappings remain the same as the tar-
get’s, because its CR3 and the target CR3 always point to the same location. Any
mapping modification in the target also takes effect in the ImEE simultaneously.
Secondly, the hypervisor ensures that the ImEE GPAs intended for introspection are
mapped in the same way as within the target. Hence, any VA for introspection is
translated consistently with the target. Note that the VA is accessed at native speed
because the MMU performs the address translation.
5.2.2 Challenges
Suppose that the ImEE has been set up following the idea above with an introspec-
tion agent running inside and accessing the target memory. The following design
challenges need to be addressed in order to achieve a successful introspection.
Functionality Challenge The ImEE agent’s virtual address space comprises
the executable code, data buffers to read and write, and the target kernel’s address
space. Since the agent code and data are logically different from the target kernel,
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there needs to be a way to properly split the GPA domain so that VAs for the local
uses are not mapped to the target and VAs for introspection are not mapped to the
agent memory.
This challenge to divide the GPA domain is further complicated by two issues.
Firstly, the virtual address space layout of the target is not priorly known, because it
is entirely dependent on the current thread in the target. Therefore, it is a challenge
to device a universal mechanism to load the ImEE agent regardless the target’s ad-
dress space layout. Secondly, read/write operations on the local memory and on the
target memory are not distinguishable to the hardware. Therefore, it is difficult to
separate access to local pages and target pages. For example, it is difficult to detect
whether a VA for introspection is wrongly mapped to the local data (which could be
induced by the target kernel inadvertently or willfully) because it does not violate
the access permissions on the page table.
Security Challenge The ImEE is not fully isolated from the adversary. The
target VM’s kernel has the full control of the VA-to-GPA mappings which affect the
resulting HPA. Hence, the adversary can manipulate the ImEE agent’s control flow
and data flow by modifying the mappings at runtime. Although access permissions
can be enforced via the GPA-to-HPA translation, the adversary can still redirect the
memory reference at one page to another with the same permissions.
A more subtle, yet important issue, is the introspection blind spot, namely the
set of virtual addresses in the target which are not reachable by the ImEE agent.
As shown in Figure 5.2, a VA for introspection is in the blind spot if and only if
it is mapped to the GPA for local use. This is because the full address translation
ends up with a local page, instead of the target VM’s page. The malicious target
can turn its pages into the blind spot by manipulating its guest page table. The
blind spot issue has two implications. First, detecting its existence efficiently is
challenging. Note that it is time-consuming to find out all VAs in the blind spot,
because the guest page tables have to be traversed to obtain the GPA corresponding
to a suspicious VA. Second, the attacker can manipulate VA to GPA mappings in an
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attempt to disrupt the execution of the ImEE agent. By manipulating the mappings,
the attacker tries to cause invalid code to be executed inside the environment, or
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the blind spot comprising three virtual pages (in the dark
color). Target kernel objects in those pages cannot be introspected since they are
mapped to the local memory.
Performance Challenge Although the ImEE agent accesses the target memory
at native speed, the goal is to minimize the time for setting it up in order to maximize
its capability of quickly responding to real-time events and/or adapting to a new in-
trospection target (e.g., another thread in the target VM or even another target VM).
The challenge is how to load the agent into the virtual address space currently de-
fined by the target thread and to prepare the corresponding GPA-to-HPA mappings.
Searching in the virtual address space is not an option since it is time-consuming to
walk the target VM’s paging structures. In addition, it is also desirable to minimize
the hypervisor’s runtime involvement, because the incurred VM exit and VM entry
events cost non-negligible CPU time.
Besides the above three major challenges, there are other minor issues related to
the runtime event handling, such as page faults and the target VM’s EPT updates.
The requirement of Out-of-VM introspection is to minimize intrusive effects on the
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target. For example, the hypervisor is refrained from modifying the target VM’s
guest page tables because it leads to execution exceptions in the target. Therefore,
the minor issues also need careful treatment.
5.2.3 System Overview
The ImEE is in essence a special virtual machine which is created and terminated
by the hypervisor based on the VMI application’s request. Like a normal VM,
the ImEE hardware consists of a vCPU core and a segment of physical memory,
both (de)allocated by the hypervisor when needed. No I/O device is attached to the
ImEE. The ImEE does not have an OS and the only software running in it is the
















Figure 5.3: Overview of ImEE-based introspection. The box with dashed lines
illustrates the mixture of physical memory. The shadowed regions belong to the
target and are not trusted.
The VMI application can launch the ImEE, put it into sleep, and terminate it.
Like a regular VM, the ImEE can also migrate from one core to another. While the
ImEE is active, it runs in sessions which is defined as the tenure of its CR3 content.
To kick off a session, the hypervisor either induces a VM exit or intercepting CR3
changes in the target.
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5.3 The Design Details
In this section, first, the internals of the ImEE is presented with the focus on the
paging structures, and then the ImEE agent is explained. The design choices for per-
formance are shown where appropriate. Lastly, the lifecycle of ImEE is described,
focusing on the runtime issues such as transitions between sessions.
The approach is to carefully concert system design, e.g., setting the ImEE’s
EPTs and software design (i.e. crafting the agent) so that the ImEE agent execution
straddles between two virtual address spaces: one for the local usage and the other
for accessing the target VM.
5.3.1 ImEE Internals
The ImEE requires a vCPU core which can be migrated from one core to another.
It also comprises one executable code frame and one read/writable data frame. The
former stores the agent code while the latter stores the agent’s input and output data.
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 memory  memory 
Figure 5.4: The solid arrows describe the translation for a VA within the ImEE,
while the dotted arrows describe the translation inside the target. All target frames
accessible to the ImEE agent are set as read-only and non-executable in EPTT .
According to the CR3 content, the agent runs either in the local address space
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or the target address space, as depicted in Figure 5.4. When in the local address
space, the agent interacts with the VMI application. While it runs in the target
address space, it reads the target memory. The code frame is mapped into both
spaces while the data frame is mapped in the local address space only.
Local Address Space The paging structures used in the local address space
comprise GPTL and EPTL, which map the entire space to the ImEE frames. GPTL
only consists of two pages as shown in Figure 5.5. The global flag on the GPTL is
set so that the local address space mappings in the TLB are not flushed out during
CR3 update. Specifically, only one virtual page is mapped to the data frame while
all others are mapped to the code frame. With this setup, the agent code can execute
from all but one page. Moreover, the GPAs of the ImEE frames are not within the









Figure 5.5: The Illustration of GPTL. All entries in the page table directory point to
the same page table page which has one PTE points to the data frame and all other
to the code frame.
Target Address Space The target address space implements the idea in Fig-
ure 5.1. To run the agent in this space, the ImEE CR3 register is synchronized
with the target CR3, so that they use the same guest page tables. The GPA-to-HPA
mappings used in this space are governed by EPTT and EPTC .
All GPAs are mapped to the target frames by EPTT , except that one page is
redirected by EPTC to the ImEE code frame. Specifically, EPTT is populated with
the GPA-to-HPA mappings from the target VM’s EPT, except that all target frames
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are guarded by read-only and non-executable permissions. This stops the agent from
modifying the target memory for the sake of non-intrusiveness. It also prevents the
adversary from injecting code, because the adversary can place arbitrary binaries to
those frames. The permission of the mapping defined by EPTC is set as executable-
only. Namely, it cannot be read or written from the target address space.
Note that the ImEE data frame is not mapped in the target address space for two
reasons. Firstly, it minimizes the number of GPA pages redirected from the target to
the ImEE, and therefore reduces the potential blind spot. Secondly, allmemory read
accesses performed in the target address space are bounded to the target. Therefore,
it is feasible to configure the hardware to regulate memory accesses so that any
manipulation on the target GPT that attempts to redirect the introspection access to
the ImEE memory is caught by a page fault exception.
CAVEAT. Address switches inside the ImEE does not cause any changes on the
EPT level. The GPA-to-HPA mappings used in one address space are cached in
the ImEE TLBs and are not automatically invalidated during switches. Note that
EPTL, EPTC and EPTT do not have conflict mappings because they map different
GPA ranges. The two address spaces are assigned with different Process-Context
Identifier (PCID) to avoid undesired TLB invalidation on address space switch.
5.3.2 ImEE Agent
The ImEE agent is the only piece of code running inside the ImEE, without the OS
or other programs. It is granted with Ring 0 privilege so that it has the privilege
to read the target kernel memory and to manage its own system settings, such as
updating the CR3 register. It is self-contained without external dependency and
does not incur address space layout changes at runtime in the sense that all the
needed memory resources are priorly defined and allocated.
The description below involves many addresses. Table 5.1 defines the notations.
Overview The main logic of the agent is as follows. Initially, the agent runs in
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VA GPA
ImEE data Pd GPd
ImEE code (local addr. space) Pc GPc
ImEE code (target addr. space) Pc GP 0c
Target page Pt GPt
Table 5.1: Address notations. For instance, GP c is the guest physical address of
the ImEE code page in the local address space.
the local address space and reads an introspection request from the data frame. Then
it switches to the target address space and reads the targeted memory data from the
target memory into the registers. Finally, it switches back to the local address space,
dumps the fetched data to the data page and fetches the next request.
The Agent Figure 5.6 presents the pseudo code of the agent. The agent has only
one code page and one data page. Since the data frame is out of the target address
space, all needed introspection parameters (e.g., the destination VA and the number
of bytes to read) are loaded into the general-purpose registers (Line 6). For the same
reason, the agent loads the target memory data into the ImEE floating-point registers
as a cache (Line 12), before switching to the local address space to write to the data
frame (Line 17).
The agent is loaded at Pc in the local address space by the hypervisor. Pc is
chosen by the hypervisor such that it is an executable page according to the target’s
guest page table. Because GPTL maps the entire VA range (except one page) to the
code frame, there is an overwhelming probability that Pc is also an executable page
in the local address space1. Therefore, the agent can execute in the two address
spaces back and forth which explain Line 12 and 17 can run successfully without
relocation.
Impact of TLB No matter whether there is an attack or not, TLB retention has
no adverse effect on the introspection. Suppose that the mappings in the local ad-
dress space are cached in the TLB. When the agent runs in the target address space,
the only VAs involved are for the instructions (Pc) and the target addresses (Pt). For
1In case Pc is not executable under GPTL, the hypervisor only needs to adjust the corresponding
PTE.
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1: while TRUE do
2: /* local address space: Read the request */
3: repeat
4: poll the interface lock;
5: until the lock is off
6: Read the request from the data frame to general-purpose registers;
7:
8: /* switch to target address space */
9: Load the target CR3 provided by the hypervisor;
10:
11: /* target access */
12: Move n bytes from the target address x to floating-point registers;
13:
14: /*switch to local address space */
15: Load CR3 with GPTL;
16: /* output to data frame */
17: Move data from the floating-point registers to the ImEE data page;
18: if requested service not completed then
19: goto Line 9;
20: end if
21: Set interface lock;
22: end while
Figure 5.6: The sketch of the ImEE agent’s pseudo code
VAs in Pc, the cached mapping remains valid because the address mappings are not
changed. There are two exclusive cases for Pt. If Pt 6= Pd, the translation does not
hit any TLB entry because it is never used in the local address space. Otherwise,
the TLB entry for Pd is still considered as a miss because of different PCIDs. The
same reasoning also applies to the cached mappings in the target address space.
Note that the adversary gains no advantage from a TLB hit on a cached local
address space translation. Since EPTL is available in the target address space, the
adversary can manipulate its own page tables to achieve the same outcome as a TLB
hit. It can use arbitrary GPA in its page tables.
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5.3.3 Defeating Attacks via the Blind Spot
The introspection security demands the agent execution to have both control flow
integrity and data flow integrity. Data confidentiality is also required since the leak-
age of the introspection targets can help the adversary evade introspection. The EPT
settings of the ImEE and of the target ensure that the adversary can only launch side-
channel attacks, which is beyond the scope of the study.
The only attack vectors exposed by the ImEE to the adversary are the shared
GPT and the target physical memory which are fully controlled by the adversary.
The adversary can manipulate the VA-to-GPA mappings for Pc and Pt. Depend-
ing on the specific manipulation, either such attempts can be detected by the EPT
violation triggered, or the attack does not adversely affect the introspection.
Detecting Blind Spot The attacks on Pc is defeated by the fact that the code
frame is the only executable frame inside the ImEE. Hence, the attack on Pc’s map-
ping, i.e. mapping Pc to a page in GPt, is doomed to trigger an EPT violation
exception. Similarly, mapping Pt to GP 0c also triggers EPT violations because the
read is on an execute-only page.
Defeating Mapping Attacks The attack attempts that manipulate the mappings
of Pt do not adversely affect the introspection. Specifically, there are three cases for
the GPt whose virtual page Pt is mapped to by the adversary.
• GPt = GP 0c. Nonetheless, the EPTC maps the agent code frame non-
readable. Therefore, an EPT violation exception is thrown. The hypervisor
can find out the faulting VA and reports to the VMI tool. The hypervisor can
also reload the agent into a new executable page to introspect the faulting
page. This is the same case as in detecting blind spot described above.
• GPt 6= GP 0c, andGPt is within the pre-assigned GPA range for the target VM.
In this case, the ImEE’sMMUwalks the target VM’s GPT and fetches the data
in the same way as in the target VM. In other words, the mapping consistency
between the ImEE and the target VM is still guaranteed. Although the agent
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may read invalid data, its execution is not affected by such mappings. The
attack has no harm to the execution as it is equivalent to feeding poisonous
contents to the VMI application, in the hope to exploit a programming vul-
nerability. This is the inevitable risk faced by any memory introspection and
can be coped with software security countermeasures.
• GPt is mapped out of the pre-assigned GPA range for the target. If GPt =
GPd orGPt = GPc, the attack causes the agent to read from the ImEE frames;
otherwise it causes an EPT page fault as the needed mapping is absent. This
case is not considered as a blind-spot problem, because the target VM’s EPT
does not have the mapping for GPt. Hence, the target VM’s kernel, including
the adversary, is not able to access this page. This attack does not give the
adversary any advantage over mapping Pt to an in-range GPA whose physical
frame stores the same contents prepared by the adversary. (Note that ImEE
do not assume or rely on the secrecy of the introspection code.)
5.3.4 Operations of ImEE
Initialization To start the introspection, the hypervisor loads the needed agent code
and data into the memory. It initializes EPTT as a copy of the entire EPT used
for the target, and allocates a vCPU core for the ImEE. The ImEE CR3 is initially
loaded with the address of GPTL. target’s page table directory address.
In case the target’s EPT occupies too many pages, the hypervisor copies them
in an on-demand fashion. In other words, when the agent’s target memory access
encounters a missing GPA-to-HPA mapping, the hypervisor then copies the EPT
page from the target’s EPT. Note that it does not weaken security or effectiveness,
because the EPTs are managed by the hypervisor only.
Activation Based on the VMI application’s request, the hypervisor launches the
ImEE wherein the agent runs in the local address space with an arbitrarily chosen
virtual address. The start of a session is marked by the target VM’s CR3 capture.
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If it is the first session, the hypervisor may send out an Inter-Processor Interrupt
(IPI) to the target VM, or induce an EPT violation to the target, or passively wait
for a natural VM-exit (which is more stealthy). After trapping the core, the hypervi-
sor configures the target’s Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) to intercept
CR3 updates on it. Namely, the execution of CR3 loading instruction(s) on the cap-
tured vCPU triggers a VM exit. Note that the target’s other vCPUs (if any) are not
affected.
Agent Reloading Once the target CR3 value is switched, the hypervisor sends
an IPI to the ImEE CPU to cause it to trap to the hypervisor. The hypervisor then
reloads the agent. If the agent is currently running in the target address space, its
CR3 in the VMCS is immediately replaced. The hypervisor then extracts the page
frame number from the target’s Instruction Pointer (IP). It replaces the page frame
number in the ImEE IP with the one in the target IP without changing the offset.
Since the agent code lies within one page, preserving the offset allows it to smoothly
continue the interrupted execution.
If the agent is in the local address space, the CR3 for the new target address space
is saved in a register. The crux of the session transition is tominimize the hypervisor
execution time as it hinders the ImEE’s performance by holding the core.
ImEE use a lazy-allocation method to find GP 0c for the purpose of setting up
EPTC . When the agent resumes execution, an EPT violation is triggered because the
corresponding physical page is mapped as read-only in EPTT . From the exception,
the hypervisor reads the faulting GPA, changes the corresponding EPT permissions,
and restores the previous one to read-only. The newly modified EPTT entry becomes
the new EPTC . Since the lazy method uses the MMU to find GP 0c, it saves the CPU
time for walking the page table.
Page Fault Handling Although it is rare for kernel introspection, it is possible
to encounter a page fault due to absent pages in the target VM. One possible reason
is that the malware inside the target attempts to evade introspection by swapping
out page content to disk. In this case, since the mapping inside ImEE is consistent
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with the one in the target VM, introspection on the swapped-out page results in a
page fault inside ImEE. This behavior is the expected consequence of maintaining
mapping consistency between ImEE and the target. The effectiveness of ImEE’s
introspection is not undermined because once the swapped-out page is swapped in,
it is visible to ImEE immediately.
For the sake of resilience, ImEE installs a page fault handler inside the ImEE.
Since the agent resides in Ring 0, the exceptions do not cause any context switch.
Out of the consideration of transparency and stealthiness, the ImEE’s page fault
handler does not attempt to resolve the cause. Instead, it simply runs dozens of
NOP instructions and retries the read. If the rounds of failure exceed the predefined
threshold, it aborts the execution.
5.4 Implementation
In this section, the details of ImEE prototype implementation is presented. The
prototype is based on KVM. The introspection tools implemented on top of the
prototype are also described.
5.4.1 ImEE on KVM
A prototype of the ImEE and its agent are implemented on Ubuntu 12.04 with Linux
kernel 3.2.79. The implementation adds around 1400 SLOC to the Linux KVM
module. The main changes on the KVM module include two new ioctl call
handlers as the interface for the VMI application to request the ImEE setup and
execution. The new handlers leverage existing KVM utility in the kernel to setup
the ImEE as a special VM.
The KVM’s handling of VM-exit events is customized in order to achieve better
performance. Those events intended for the ImEE introspection are redirected to
the new handler dedicated for the ImEE. Therefore, the long execution path of the
KVM’s event handling routines is bypassed.
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5.4.2 Specialized Agent
According to the commonly seen memory reading patterns, three types of ImEE
agents are implemented as listed in Table 5.2. The Type-1 agent performs a block
read, i.e., to read a contiguous memory block at the base address. The Type-2 agent
performs a traversal read, i.e., to read the specified member(s) of a list of structured
objects chained together through a pointer defined in the structure. The Type-3
agent reads the memory in the same way as the Type-2, except that the extracted
member is a pointer and a dereference is performed to read another structure. Note
that the Type-2 and 3 agents are particularly useful for traversing the kernel objects.




Table 5.2: Three ImEE agents. The Type-3 agent uses 2 pointer deferences while
the Type-2 agent uses one.
The interface between the VMI application and the ImEE agent are two fixed-
size buffers residing on the agent’s data frame and being mapped into the VMI
application’s space. One buffer is for the request to the agent and the other stores
the reply from the agent. Both buffers are guarded by one spin-lock to resolve the
read-write conflict from both sides. When the ImEE session starts, the agent polls
the buffer and serves the request. The VMI application ensures that the reply buffer
is not overflowed. The polling based approach is faster than using interrupts as it
does not induce any VM-exit/entry.
5.4.3 Usability
The simple interface of ImEE allows easy development of introspection tools. For
common introspection tasks that focus on kernel data structures, the development
requires a selection of the agent type, and a set of memory reading parameters in-
cluding the starting virtual address, the number of bytes to read, and the offset(s)
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used for traversal. Based on this method, four user space VMI programs are de-
veloped. They collect different critical kernel objects and have distinct memory
reading behaviors. The objectives and logics of the four programs are explained
below.
• syscalldmp It dumps totally 351 entries of the guest’s system call table
pointed to by sys call table. A continuous block of 1404 bytes from
the guest is returned to the program.
• pidlist It lists all process identifiers in the guest. It traverses the
task struct list pointed to by the kernel symbol init task, and records
the PID value of every visited structure in the list. In total, 4 bytes are re-
turned while 8 bytes are read from the guest for each task.
• pslist It lists all tasks’ identifiers and task names stored in task struct.
A task’s name is stored in the member comm with a fixed size of 16 bytes.
Hence, 24 bytes are returned for each task node.
• credlist It lists all tasks’ credential structures referenced by the
task struct’s cred pointer. In total, 116 bytes including the credential
structure to the application for each task node are read. Hence, it takes more
time than pidlist and pslist.
Because of their different memory access patterns, they run with different types
of agents. The syscalldmp tool runs with Type-1 agent to perform block-reads. The
pidlist and pslist programs work with Type-2 agent and the credlist program works
with Type-3 agent. These tools are linked with a small wrapper code to interact with
the ImEE-enabled KVM module via the customized ioctl handler.
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5.5 Evaluation
The prototype is evaluated from four aspects with LibVMI as the baseline. Lib-
VMI [72] is a cross-platform introspection library which a variety of tools depend
on. LibVMI is the only open-source tool that provides a comprehensive set of API
for reading the memory of a VM. In particular, it provides the capability to handle
translation from VA to GPA. Therefore, LibVMI plays the role of a building block
for live memory access in tools such as Drakvuf [61] and Volatility [95]. The eval-
uation consists of four parts. Firstly, the overhead of ImEE is evaluated, in terms
of component costs and the impact on the target VM due to CR3-update intercep-
tion. Secondly, the ImEE’s throughput in reading the target memory is measured.
Thirdly, the introspection performance of the tools is compared with two function-
ally equivalent ones implemented with the LibVMI and in the kernel. Lastly, ImEE
is compared with LibVMI in a setting with multiple guest VMs.
The hardware platform used to evaluate the implementation is a Dell OptiPlex
990 desktop computer with an Intel Core i7-2600 3.4GHz processor (supporting
VT-x) and 4GB DRAM. The target VM in the experiments is a normal KVM in-
stance with 1GB of RAM and 1 vCPU.
5.5.1 ImEE Overhead
Table 5.3 summarizes the overheads of the ImEE. It takes a one-time cost of 97
µs to prepare the ImEE environment where the main tasks are to make a copy of
the target guest EPT as EPTT , to set up GPTL and EPTL, and to allocate and setup
the ImEE vCPU context. The ImEE activation requires about 3.2 µs, and the agent
loading/reloading time is around 6.5 µs. The difference is mainly due to handling
of the incoming IPI by host kernel on the ImEE core in the agent reloading case. In
comparison, it takes about 100 milliseconds to initialize the LibVMI setting, which
is around 1,000 times slower than the ImEE setup.
Guest CR3 Update Interception To maintain CR3 consistency with the target
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Overhead ImEE LibVMI
Launch time 97 µs 100 ms




Table 5.3: Overhead comparison between ImEE and LibVMI.
during a session, the hypervisor intercepts the CR3 updates. To evaluate its per-
formance impact on the target, the entailed time cost is measured and run several
benchmarks to assess the VM’s performance.
The cost due to interception mainly consists of VM-exit, sending an IPI, record-
ing VMCS data, and VM-entry. In total, it takes about 2000 CPU cycles which
amounts 0.58 µs in the experiment platform. Three performance benchmarks are
run: LMbench [6] for system performance, Bonnie++ [2] for disk performance and
SPECint 2006 [10] for CPU performance while context switches during their exe-
cutions are intercepted by the hypervisor. Figure 5.7 reports the LMbench score for



























Figure 5.7: LMBench: normalized result on context switch time. The higher score
means better performance.
Nonetheless, the interception does not seem to incur noticeable impact to other
benchmark results such as disk I/O and network I/O, as shown in Figure 5.8, 5.9 and
5.10. This effect can be attributed to the relatively fewer number of context switches
involved during the macro-benchmark runs, because the benchmark processes fully
occupy the CPU time slot. It is typical for a Linux process to have between 1ms to
10 ms time-slot before being scheduled off from the CPU.
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Figure 5.9: Bonnie++: normalized results on disk performance. The higher score
means better performance.
ferent workloads are tested on the target VM: idle, online video streaming and file
downloading. Neither test shows noticeable performance drop. When the target is
under interception, the video is rendered smoothly without noticeable jitters and the
file downloading still saturates the network bandwidth.
In the experiments, the introspection encounters few context switches in the
target VM. To understand this phenomenon, experiments are run to measure the in-
tervals between context switches. Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of their lengths
under different workloads. The analysis shows that the context switch is expected to
occur after around 40 µs, which could be used as a guideline for the VMI applica-
tion to determine the duration of a session. Note that an encounter with the context
switch costs about 6.5 µs for the introspection and 0.58 µs for the target VM.
Lastly, the ImEE has a small memory footprint of a few hundred KB on the
host OS. LibVMI has a large memory footprint as it uses up to 14MB to perform a



































































Figure 5.11: The frequency distribution of interval lengths between context switches
in three workloads: idle, video streaming and file downloading. The x-axis is not
displayed to the scale.
5.5.2 Guest Access Speed
The turnaround time for accessing the VM refers to the interval between sending
a request and the arrival of the reply. It consists of the time spent for checking the
shared buffers and the agent’s execution time. To assess the efficiency of the ImEE’s
interface with the VMI application, the turnaround time is measured with the ImEE
agent performing no task but returning immediately. The result is approximately
265 CPU cycles (or 77 ns).
To evaluate the memory-reading performance of the ImEE, experiments are run
to evaluate the turnaround time with normal read requests. Table 5.4 below reports
the turnaround time in comparison with LibVMI for the same workload. To make
a fair comparison, LibVMI’s translation cache is turned on whereas the page-level
data cache is turned off.
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Table 5.4: Memory read performance comparison.
ImEE is also tested with the experiment described in Section 5.1. The experi-
ment shows that the modification on the cred address is caught immediately when
the malware makes the first attack. Note that with the ImEE support, it takes less
than 1200 CPU cycles for the VMI application to get a DWORD from the guest,
in contrast to more than 60,000 cycles using LibVMI. The maximum introspection
frequency of ImEE based introspection is 2.83 MHz while an introspection using
LibVMI in the experiment setting can only achieve 54 KHz in maximum.
5.5.3 Introspection Performance Comparison
The introspection tools (syscalldump, pidlist, pslit and credlist) are run in three
settings: within the kernel, with ImEE, and with LibVMI. Since this set of tests
concerns with real-life scenarios, LibVMI is tested on both KVM and Xen for com-
pleteness. For each of the scenario, the turnaround time of introspection is mea-
sured. The time for the processing of the semantics and the time for setting up
the ImEE/LibVMI are not included in the measurement. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6
summarize the results.
Tools Kernel module ImEEtime mode
syscalldmp 0.2 2.9 block
pidlist 10 31.6 traversal
pslist 10.4 38.6 traversal
credlist 25.3 25.6 hybrid
Table 5.5: Kernel object introspection performance in kernel and ImEE (time in µs).
The experiments show that the ImEE-based introspection has a comparable per-
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Tools LibVMI(KVM / Xen)without any cache without page cache with all cache
syscalldmp 28.2 / 43 18.7 / 47 2 / 54
pidlist 5,887 / 2,180 2,864 / 2,041 1,568 / 490
pslist 8,319 / 1477 2,695 / 1,442 1,672 / 542
credlist 8,234 / 2,274 7,150 / 2,153 2,215 / 757
Table 5.6: Kernel object introspection performance by LibVMI (time in µs).
formance to running inside the kernel. It has a superior performance advantage over
LibVMI for traversing the kernel object lists. On KVM, The LibVMI based intro-
spection is around 50 times slower than the ImEE with all caches and 300 times
slower without cache. On Xen, LibVMI is around 15 times and 70 times slower,
respectively. Since the traversal only returns a few bytes from different pages, Lib-
VMI’s optimization in bulk data transferring does not result in performance gain.
5.5.4 Handling Multiple VMs
In a data center setting, a large number of VMs are hosted on the same physical
server. Therefore, for a VMI solution to be effective in such a setting, the capa-
bility to handle multiple VM is important. Besides raw introspection speed, two
additional capabilities are important for a VMI solution. Firstly, the VMI solution
should respond quickly to requests to introspect VMs encountered for the first time.
Secondly, it should also maintain swift response for introspection requests on VMs
already launched.
The time taken for LibVMI and ImEE to perform a syscall table dump by the
tools is measured in two scenarios. Four VMs are launched on the experiment
platform. Firstly, the time taken for each solution to introspect four VMs once for
each in a sequence is measured. It takes 561 ms for LibVMI and 377 µs for ImEE,
respectively. In this case, LibVMI is about 1,400 times slower than ImEE. The
performance of LibVMI is mainly due to the initialization needed for each newly
encountered VM.
Secondly, the time taken for each solution for switching the introspection tar-
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get among the four VMs that are already scanned is measured. The switching re-
quires resetting certain data between consecutive scans. For this purpose, LibVMI
is slightly modified to allow us to update the CR3 value in the introspection context
of a VM with a new one. The experiment shows that it takes 19 ms for LibVMI to
perform such work while 4.4 µs for ImEE. ImEE shows around 4,300 times speed
up. The reason is that LibVMI’s software-based approach needs to reset a number
of memory states. In contrast, ImEE only needs to fetch the current CR3 on the




In-memory paging structure is only one of the factors that determines the final out-
come of the translation of a virtual address. In fact, the final outcome is determined
by both in-memory state and in-CPU states. The affecting in-CPU states include
control registers and buffers such as the TLB. For example, the TLB can be inten-
tionally made out-of-sync with paging structures in memory, therefore causes the
introspection code to use a different mapping from the one currently used by the
target. An ideal introspection solution should take into consideration both sets of
states because they collectively represent the current address translation.
However, for out-of-VM live introspection, it is required that it runs on a core
that is independent of the target VM. This limits the introspection’s capability to
utilize such in-CPU states because there is no mechanism to fetch in-CPU states
from another CPU. One possible solution is to preempt the vCPU of the target on a
physical core by a more privileged entity such as the hypervisor, trying to preserve
as many in-CPU states as possible, including buffers and caches. However, the be-
havior of the buffers and caches when across VM transition is not fixed. Therefore,
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without hardware assistance, attempts to implement an ideal solution is likely met
with hardware-specific tweaks and hacks, making it very difficult.
5.6.2 Integration with Existing VMI Tools
The ImEE serves as the guest access engine for the VMI applications without in-
volving kernel semantics. It is not challenging to retrofit exiting VMI tools that
focus on high-level semantics to benefit from the ImEE’s performance and security.
Using VMST [42] as an example, we show how to combine a VMI application with
the ImEE. When an introspection instruction is executed in VMST, the XED library
[14] decides whether a data access should be redirected to the guest VM or not. If
so, the code fetches the data from the guest memory by traversing the guest VM’s
page table in the same way as LibVMI. It is easy to integrate VMST with the ImEE.
When a read redirection is generated by the XED library, the code simply issues a
memory read request to the ImEE and waits for the reply. With the support from the
ImEE, shadow TLB and shadow CR3 proposed in VMST are no longer needed.
5.6.3 ImEE vs. In-VM Introspection
Strictly speaking, the ImEE and in-VM introspection systems are not comparable,
as they are geared for different purposes. The ImEE is for effective target VM access
while in-VM systems are designed for reusing the OS’s capability [49, 24] or for
monitoring events in the guest [81]. Since Process-Implant [49] and SYRINGE
[24] rely on a trusted guest kernel, the ImEE is compared with SIM [81] from the
perspective of accessing the target VM memory.
Security Address space isolation in SIM prevents the target VM kernel from
tampering with SIM data and code. In a multi-core VM, it does not prevent the
target VM kernel from interrupting SIM code execution by using non-maskable
interrupts. By knocking down the SIM thread from its CPU core, the rootkit can
safely erase the attack traces without being caught. In comparison, the entire ImEE
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environment is separated from the target VM. It is much more challenging (if not
feasible) for the target VM kernel to disrupt the ImEE agent’s execution. Note that
the manipulation on the page tables backfires on the adversary since they are shared
between the adversary and the target.
Effectiveness SIM does not enforce consistent address mappings. The SIM
code and the target VM threads are in separated address spaces, namely using sep-
arated page tables. The SIM hypervisor does not update the SIM page tables ac-
cording to the updates in the kernel. In comparison, any update on the target VM
page table takes immediate effect on the ImEE and CR3 consistency is ensured by
the hypervisor.
Performance and Usability Both SIM and ImEE make native speed accesses
to the memory without emulating the MMU. ImEE uses EPT and does not require
any modification on the target VM, while SIM relies on the shadow page tables and
makes non-negligible changes on the target VM.
5.6.4 Paging Modes Compatibility
The design of ImEE is by nature compatible with various paging modes such as
Physical Address Extension mode (PAE mode) and 64-bit paging. It only requires
setting of two additional bits in the control registers, namely PAE bit in CR4 register
and LME bit in EFER register so that the ImEE core runs in the needed paging mode.
To prevent the adversary from changing the paging mode, the hypervisor trap access
to the above registers. To introspect a 64-bit VM, the agent needs to be compiled
into 64-bit code as well. In fact, the ImEE performs better on a 64-bit platform,
because there are more general purpose registers available, reducing the number of




The ImEE’s design is also compatible to other multi-core architectures such as
ARM, on the condition that the hardware supports MMU virtualization. Like the
x86 platform, ARM multi-core processors also feature a per-core MMU, thus each
core’s translation can be performed independently. As a result, a core can be set up
to use the translation used by the other, by setting it to use the same root of paging
structures. Moreover, by using TTBR0 and TTBR1, the hypervisor can easily
separate the virtual address ranges used for the target accessing and for the local
usage. It simplifies the design as both can use separated page tables. The ARM
processor also grants the software more control over the TLB entries. Thus, the
needed TLB entries can be locked by the agent. Therefore, it is expected to have




The discussion in this dissertation is concerned with an adversary with the kernel
privilege. The adversary may gain such privilege via infecting the system with
rootkits, or by modifying the underlying OS behavior with launching attacks. Due
to the high privilege, the adversary can cause serious consequences by performing
arbitrary attacks. It may access encryption keys in the process memory, read files
which only legitimate users can access, or even manipulate the devices directly. In
a traditional system architecture, it is extremely challenging to defend against such
an adversary.
By introducing an additional layer below the OS in the traditional system archi-
tecture, virtualization techniques turn out to be an effective way to defend against
the adversaries with kernel privilege. In the virtualization architecture, the OS is no
longer assigned the highest privilege. Instead, the hypervisor assumes it. The OS is
in turn, deprivileged to run in a domain which is managed by the hypervisor. In this
architecture, even if the adversary obtains the kernel privilege, it is still confined
and restricted by the hypervisor. Therefore, the attacker’s damage is contained.
A number of systems have been proposed based on this architecture. Some
systems directly utilize the virtualization architecture and run different applications
in different domains according to their trustworthiness. The trusted application runs
in the trusted domain, while the untrusted in the untrusted domain. Therefore, even
121
if the untrusted domain is attacked, the trusted domain is still not affected because
they are isolated. This approach, termed domain isolation, still requires the trusted
domain to have a complete OS which is included in its TCB. Therefore, the TCB of
this design is still large.
Later systems attempted to reduce this TCB by reusing certain facilities in the
untrusted domain such as dynamic memory allocation and file systems. However,
this design blurs the isolation boundary between the trusted domain and untrusted
and leads to potential issues. The most prominent issue is the reuse of guest page
tables. The guest page tables define the VA-to-GPAmappings, therefore, the address
space of the trusted domain is still, in part, controlled by the untrusted domain.
Existing systems realized this issue and all perform certain kind of checks on the
guest page tables to ensure that the mappings in the guest page table do not violate
the desired policy.
However, such checks are usually ad-hoc and not systematic. There is no clear
assumptions stated about the capabilities of the attacker. Therefore, when faced
with attacker with new capabilities, such checks quickly fail. As exemplified by
the multicore platform attacks, i.e. the stifling attack and the VPID attack, the
concurrent execution of the guest kernel allows modification of the guest page table
either during the check or after the check by introducing race conditions. Therefore,
the effectiveness of the systems requires re-investigation.
In the re-investigation, the analysis is based on a common pattern of the con-
struction of these systems. These systems all need to translate a set of high-level
policies into a form that can be expressed with abstractions in the virtualization con-
text. Three elements in the policies need to be translated, namely, subjects, objects
and operations. Plus, due to the idiosyncrasies of the virtualization mechanism, ad-
ditional runtime considerations also need to be included. The analysis identified
issues with the management of the identities of the subjects and objects as well as
a few runtime enforcement issues. All these issues affect the effectiveness of the
policy enforcement. In addition, two attacks are presented that shows that the ker-
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nel level adversary can leverage hardware features and concurrent execution to keep
stale permission, so that it can break the isolation boundary setup by the hypervisors
which does not consider multicore platforms.
The FIMCE system is designed to address the issues uncovered during the anal-
ysis. FIMCE is a fully isolated and flexible environment that completely isolates
the malicious kernel from sensitive applications. The memory, CPU states and any
devices are all isolated with a carefully delineated boundary. In FIMCE, the iden-
tity issues do not exist because the FIMCE instances are directly managed by the
hypervisor. The issues caused by concurrent execution does not exist because of the
complete isolation boundary. On top of its security, FIMCE is also a flexible and
nimble architecture that can be tailored for various use cases. Meanwhile, FIMCE
comes with minimum interference with the execution of both the isolated applica-
tion and the guest VM, thereby minimizing performance overheads.
Lastly, it is shown that the FIMCE environment can be applied in the context of
VMI and the ImEE system is presented. The ImEE introspection system builds on
top of the idea of FIMCE and tweaks its address mappings. The ImEE environment
is configured with the same page tables used by the target VM under introspection.
Therefore, it has a consistent address mapping with the guest. The guest’s modifi-
cation on the page table will take effect immediately inside ImEE as well, therefore,
it cannot make transient changes and try to hide the presence of malicious behavior.
With the help of hardware, ImEE runs with a remarkable performance boost while
still keeping the consistent address mappings.
The systems presented in this document can be extended along a few directions.
The integration between FIMCE and SGX can be explored to achieve strong isola-
tion with secure I/O. The ImEE can be integrated with existing tools for improved
security and performance. The designs presented can also be applied in other ar-




API: Application Programming Interface
APIC: Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
BIOS: Basic Input/Output System
CPU: Memory Management Unit
CPL: Current Privilege Level
DMA: Direct Memory Access
DPL: Descriptor Privilege Level
DRTM: Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement
ELF: Executable and Linkable Format
EOI: End Of Interrupt
EPC: Enclave Page Cache
EPT: Extended Page Table
FIMCE: Fully Isolated Micro-Computing Environment
GDT: Global Descriptor Table
GOT: Global Offset Table
GPA: Guest Physical Address
GPT: Guest Page Table
GPU: Graphics Processing Unit
HPA: Host Physical Address
HTML: Hyper Text Markup Language
IDT: Interrupt Descriptor Table
IID: Interface Identifier
ImEE: Immersive Execution Environment
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KVM: Kernel Virtual Machine
LAN: Local Area Network
MMIO: Memory Mapped I/O




PAE: Physical Address Extension
PAL: Piece of Application Logic
PCID: Process-Context Identifier
PCR: Platform Configuration Register
PLID: Pillar Identifier
PLT: Procedure Linkage Table
PTE: Page Table Entry
SLOC: Source Line of Code
SGX: Software Guard Extension
SMM: System Management Mode
SMP: Symmetric Multiprocessing
SSL: Secure Sockets Layer
TCB: Trusted Computing Base
TCS: Thread Control Structure
TEE: Trusted Execution Environment
TLB: Translation Lookaside Buffer
TPM: Trusted Platform Module
TSS: Task-State Segment




VMCS: Virtual Machine Control Structure
VMM: Virtual Machine Monitor
VMI: Virtual Machine Introspection
VPID: Virtual Processor Identifier
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